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L INTRODUCTION
In many parts of the world human life is sacrificed daily in
never-ending wars. In North America we have been fortunate to
escape the horrors of armed conflict, but here we fight another war.
This decade has seen governments arming themselves for a frontal
attack on an enemy that inspires fear in some and indifference in
others. We have declared war on pornography - we have begun the
battle against this intangible but redoubtable enemy.
The debate concerning the propriety of using state coercion
to combat obscenity has been so thoroughly canvassed by others
that it needs no further exposition. Notwithstanding my views on
the precarious legitimacy of using the criminal sanction to battle
obscenity I do not wish to take this opportunity to recapitulate the
arguments already presented regarding the legitimacy of the battle.
Instead of attacking the legitimacy of the battle I choose rather to
concede the inevitability of unjust wars, but hope to persuade others
to abandon the combative enterprise by focussing the discussion
upon the practical and theoretical effects of any war - the
casualties.
To illustrate the problem of casualties of this legal war I will
comment upon and criticize the most recent judicial pronouncement
on the obscenity issue, R v. Metro News.2 It will hopefully become
apparent that our judiciary is not serving its traditional task of
1 For a brief sampling of the literature see H. Clor, Obscenity and Public Morality (Chicago:
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969); J.C. Dybikowski, "Law, Liberty and Obscenity" (1972) 7 U.B.C.
L.Rev. 38; IA. Hunter, "Obscenity, Pornography and Law Reform" (1975) 2 Dalhousie L.'. 482;
W. Berns, "Pornography vs. Democracy: The Case for Censorship" (1971) 22 Pub. Interest 3;
D. Copp & S. Wendell, eds., Pornography and Censorslp: Scientific, Philosophical and Legal
Studies (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1983); S. Braun, "Freedom of Expression v.
Obscenity Censorship: The Developing Canadian Jurisprudence" (1986) 50 Sask. L. Rev. 39;
K.E. Mahoney, "Obscenity and Public Policy: Conflicting Values - Conflicting Statutes" (1986)
50 Sask. L Rev. 75; K.R. Feinberg, "Pornography and the Criminal Law" (1979) 40 U. Pitt. L,
Rev. 567; L. Lederer, ed., Take Back the Night. Women on Pornography (New York: Morrow,
1980); V. Cline ed., Where Do You Draw the Line (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young Univ. Press,
1974); J. Bakan, "Pornography, Law and Moral Theory" (1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 1.
2(1986), 53 C.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. CA.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed, 57 O.R. (2d)
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operating as a moral brake3 on the burgeoning legislative creation
of criminal offences. Rather it is contributing to an unprincipled
growth in criminal liability. In combatting a billion dollar
pornography industry the legislature has amassed a vast arsenal of
sanctions. This is an expected reaction from a law-making authority
that responds on the basis of contingent policies and the ebb and
flow of public opinion. We are in an era of pronounced public
dissatisfaction with the distribution of obscene material and the
legislature responds in a knee-jerk fashion - they rely on the
panacea of increased criminalization. In the wake of these
developments we must look to the judiciary to apply consistent and
coherent principles that place some restraint upon overly rapid
changes in the criminal law while still maintaining a modicum of
doctrinal purity in the law.
Although it may be a product of misplaced idealism we do
believe that the judicial branch of government is the best suited
institution to guard against encroachments upon liberty.4 Even if we
assume that the legislature is justified in battling pornography by
sanction, it must be agreed that there should be some constraints
upon this activity. We may be in the midst of a war, but the
peculiar nature of a legal battle precludes resort to the old adage
that "all is fair in love and war." There are established principles of
culpability that constrain the operation of the criminal law, and
without the orderly development of these principles the legal battle
is transformed into sheer domination. The Metro News case
illustrates how a court can become immersed in the battle to such
a degree that principles are replaced by politics. The autonomy of
law may be a myth, yet this is no reason for abandoning the
aspirational thrust of the myth.
In replacing principle with politics the courts have given birth
to the first two casualties of this war. The first casualty is the
innocent shopkeeper or magazine distributor who is convicted
3 The term is taken from G.PJ. McGinley, "An Inquiry into the Nature of the State and its
Relation to the Criminal Law" (1981) 19 Osgoode Hall LJ. 266 and from P. Arenella,
"Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure" (1984) 72 Geo. LJ. 185.
4presumably this assumption forms the basis for the creation of constitutional guarantees
that are enforced by the judiciary. See J.H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political
Process (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980).
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notwithstanding the absence of proof of culpability. The second
casualty is considerably more abstract yet it provides the theoretical
underpinning for the first. This casualty is legal doctrine itself. A
coherent and internally consistent legal doctrine is sacrificed for
expediency. In Metro News the relevant doctrines that are sacrificed
for the "public good" are the related doctrines of mistake of law and
officially-induced error.
In developing this theme of judicial complicity in a political
battle it will be necessary to begin this paper by outlining some of
the battles that have been fought in the political arena. In this
initial portion of the paper it will be shown that the judiciary has
been unable to refine and clarify the legislative norm - the process
of clarifying the contours of the offence becomes an impossible task
when a legislature undertakes to combat a problem without a clear
consensus as to the harm that is sought to be avoided. Once it is
shown that judicial refinement of the norm is an unattainable
safeguard the focus of the paper will shift from considering the
offence of obscenity to a consideration of sustantive criminal law
defences that are commonly raised in the context of obscenity
prosecutions. The aim of the discussion is to show how a court
conceals its considerations of expediency behind a veil of a
traditional normative analysis of culpability. In particular, the
evolution of the law has been in the direction of relaxing the
requirements for defences of mistake of law and officially-induced
error; however, the battle cries that emanate from the legislative and
executive branches of government have disturbed the orderly
development of these defences.
A. The Strategic Defence Initiative
Governments are preparing themselves to attack an industry
that "has gone from a low yield, covert business to a highly visible
multi-billion dollar industry."5 In the past two years the legislative
response to the regulation of obscenity has been swift. In Canada
the government has recently introduced bills that define pornography
See Commission, infra, note 17 at 1353; see Committee, infra, note 14 at 66.
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so as to cover virtually every form of explicit portrayal of sex.6
These all-encompassing definitions trigger offences with substantially
increased penalties. 7  In the Parliamentary debates upon this new
legislation the response to the criticism that this new statutory
scheme places a "giant chastity belt over Canadian sexuality, 8 has
been the assertion that "as legislators we have an onerous
responsibility to enact legislation which will help protect the social
and moral fabric of this country."
9
The zeal with which governments respond to the problem of
obscenity is in a perpetual state of ebb and flow. Obscenity appears
to be the type of issue that falls in and out of vogue as a topic of
discussion. It is difficult, if not impossible, to account for the wax
and wane of moral intensity in this area; however, it is apparent that
periodically government dons the garb of the moral entrepreneur in
reaction to an incident or incidents of public notoriety. For
example, after the brutal slaying of Kimberly Rabot by a teenager
who had an elaborate collection of pornographic material depicting
bondage and torture, the third session of the thirtieth Parliament
presented no less than ten bills that recommended increased legal
restrictions on obscenity.10 What is curious about the current
proposals in 1986 is that one cannot link the current initiative to a
sensational incident that has drawn public concern. Both in the
6 Bill C-114, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Customs Act, 1st Sess., 33d Par.,
1984-85-86, cl.1. This bill was soundly criticized as being overbroad and was recently replaced
by Bill C-54, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and otherActs in consequence thereof, 2d Sess.,
33d Parl., 1986-7. This more recent bill has also attracted severe criticism as being far too
drastic a response.
7For most of the offences the maximum penalty has been raised from two years to five
years.
8 H.C. Debates, vol.X, 1st Sess., 33d Parl., (16 June 1986), at 14443.
91bid. at 14530 (17 June 1986).
10For a discussion of the Rabot murder, see: "Human Rights May Need Curbs" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (5 December 1975) at 8. A coroner's inquest into this incident led
to a jury recommendation that "pornography should be defined as showing any part of the
genital area of the human body with a complete ban on such publication." For a summary of
some of the bills proposed after the Rabot incident see, Canada H.C., Standing Committee on
Justice and Legal Affairs, "Report on Pornography" No. 18 (22 March 1978). The Fraser
Committee notes that in the last decade some forty bills have been introduced in the House
of Commons, see, Committee, infra, note 14 at 131.
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United States and Canada there has been a complete volte-face in
less than 15 years. The early 1970s exhibited a tone of restraint and
mild tolerance to the proliferation of obscene materials. The Law
Reform Commission of Canada adopted the Millian position that
criminal law is a blunt instrument that should only be used in cases
of demonstrated harm to others - the Commission exhibited
pronounced skepticism as to the propriety of extensive
criminalization of obscenity.11
The American position was clearly stated in the 1970 Report
of the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography.
12
The majority of the Commission concluded that there is "no,
evidence to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a
significant role in the causation of deliquent or criminal behaviour
among youth or adults." 13 This report was an affirmation of
conventional liberal values that stress government intervention only
in the face of tangible harm to life, liberty, or security. By narrowly
drawing the list of protected interests and recognizable harms the
liberal position secures the individual from frequent government
intrusion through legal regulation.
The tide has now turned. In June 1983 the Government of
Canada established the Special Committee on Pornography and
Prostitution to consider, inter alia, "the problems of access to
pornography, its effects and what is considered to be pornographic
in Canada."14 Similarly, in the United States The Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography was constituted in February 1985 to
study, inter alia, "the dimensions of the problem of pornography." In
1985 the Fraser Committee released its report to the government of
Canada and its recommendations can be described as moderate.
The Committee was clear and emphatic in stating that it "is not
11Law Reform Commission of Canada, Limits of Criminal Law (Ottawa: Information
Canada, 1975).
1 2 United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, The Report of the Commission
on Obscenity and Pornography (New York: Random House, 1970).
131bid. at 32.
14 Report of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution, Pornography and
Prostitution in Canada, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Dept. of Justice Canada, 1985) at 5.
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prepared to state, solely on the evidence and research it has seen,
that pornography is a significant causal factor in the commission of
some forms of violent crime, in the sexual abuse of children, or in
the disintegration of communities and society."15 Accordingly, the
Committee did not recommend sweeping changes in the law, but it
did recommend some vital amendments with a view to having the
law regulating obscenity accommodate the interests of equality and
dignity. Notwithstanding the temperate approach of the Committee,
the government of Canada has put forward legislation that
significantly expands the scope of the legal regulation of obscenity
6
In the United States, the Attorney General's Commission
released their report in July 1986. Unlike the Fraser Report and
the American Commission of 1970, this commission felt that
pornography does bear a causal relationship to the primary harm of
engendering criminal conduct. The 1986 Commission discounted the
findings of its predecessor by claiming that the pornographic material
available today is substantially more explicit and violent than the
material circulating in 1970.17 The commission did not recommend
wholesale changes in the law, due to perceived constitutional
constraints, but it did strongly recommend that high priority be given
to the prosecution of obscenity,18 that the judiciary begin to
sentence offenders more harshly (i.e. suggesting incarceration for
repeat offenders),19 and that citizens involve themselves in the battle
by protesting, picketing, and launching civil suits.20
15 Tbid. at 99.
16Not only has the Canadian government disregarded the moderate recommendations of
a government-sponsored committee but in 1979 the British government ignored the
recommendations of the Williams Committee which had for the most part adopted a regulatory
approach, and not a prohibitory approach to the problem. For an interesting discussion of the
fate of the Williams Committee in England see, A.W.B. Simpson, Pornography and Politics: A
Look Back to the Williams Conzinittee (London: Waterlow, 1983).
1 7 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Print Off., 1986) at 324.
1 81bid. at 435-41.
191bid. at 441.
2 01bid. at 419-29.
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These two reports have brought the obscenity issue back in
the spotlight. For the most part, the response within the North
American community (if it can be called such) has been to suppress
and to toughen enforcement and sanctions. The reversal in attitude
cannot be traced to sordid incidents, such as the Kimberly Rabot
murder, nor can it be simply traced to a feeling of "enough is
enough" in light of the increasing availability of pornographic
material in the last fifteen years.
The re-emergence of pornography as a heated political and
social issue may be partially attributed to recent claims that have
been advanced by leading feminist scholars. This critical school of
thought has rekindled interest in this issue by moving beyond the
sterile debate between conservative advocates of legal moralism and
liberal advocates of the Millian distinction between self- and other-
regarding harm. The feminists have added a new component to the
debate with their characterization of pornography as an insidious
form of political ideology that contributes to the political and social
subjugation of women.' Unlike the conservative school of thought
that is looking to traditional moral values such as sexual modesty
and promoting the family unit, the feminists perceive pornography
as a form of hate literature that encourages the objectification and
commodification of women that inevitably leads to substantive
inequality in social and political institutions.
The feminist point of view has been influential having been
recognized by the Fraser Report and in some cases,22 but it is
unlikely that the compelling arguments emerging from this critical
school are responsible for the resurrection of the attack on
obscenity. In fact, many feminists are clearly against the notion that
increased criminalization is the answer to the problem.23 It is far
more likely that the current battle is more a product of the
contemporary ascendency of conservative thought. Political and
2 1 See, e.g. A. Dworkin, Pornography, Men Possessing Women (New York: Perigree, 1981);
C. Mackinnon, "Not A Moral Issue" (1983-84), Yale L. & Pol. Rev. at 321.
22See Committee, supra, note 14 at 18-27; S. Noonan, "Preferring the Feminist Approach
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal to that of the Fraser Committee" (1985) 45 C.R(3d)
61.
23See, V. Burstyn, ed., WomenAgainst Censorship (Vancouver. Douglas & McIntyre, 1985).
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social discourse has become infiltrated with notions of "community
parochialism ... economic reductionism ... visionary materialism and
civic passivity."24  Most significantly, a conservative orientation
invariably leads to reliance upon increased criminalization as
conservative rhetoric commonly contains the imagery of crime
control as war:
Concerning conservatism, two points might be worth making, by way of illustration.
Firstly, the increasing use of military metaphors and phrases by leading conservative
writers and politicians has been noted. It is now "crime-fighting" rather than "peace-
keeping", the "war" against crime and disorder, "battles" to be won and lost,
"emergency" situations. "You here today are in the front line of the battle against
crime" - as the Home Secretary declared in his speech to the Police Federation in
1984.25
The primary weapon in the war on obscenity remains the
catalogue of offences found in Part IV of the Criminal Code.
Section 159 prohibits the making, printing, publishing, circulating,
selling, and exposing of obscene material. Section 160 does not
contemplate prosecution but authorizes an in rem proceeding to
determine if the obscene material is to be destroyed. Section 163
prohibits the giving of an immoral, indecent, or obscene
performance. Other miscellaneous offences exist in this part of the
Code,26 but this extensive catalogue of criminal offences does not
exhaust the available weapons. All levels of government, federal,
provincial, and municipal have entered the battle.
On the federal level we find authority in the Broadcasting
Act 2 7 empowering a commission to make regulations prohibiting the
24B. Barber, "A New Language for the Left: Translating the Conservative Discourse" (Nov.
1986) Harper's Magazine at 47. Barber defines communal parochialism as the incompatibility
between local community and universal justice; visionary materialism as meaning that national
happiness and security can be bought; and civic passivity as requiring that democracy operate
solely as the governing of clients by an elected elite.
25RN. Berki, Security and Society: Reflections on Law, Order and Politics (London: Dent,
1986) at 232. The paradox of the conservative war on crime has been characterized as "in truth
a community can no more wage war on its internal ills than an organism can wage war against
its own constitutional weaknesses." See, . Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't. Print. Off., 1970) at 48.
2 6 lncluding s. 164 (mailing obscene material), s. 169 (committing indecent act), s. 170 (being
nude in public).
27Te Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1967-8, c. 25.
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broadcasting of obscene, indecent, or profane language 28. The
Canadian Post Corporation Act29 enables the Postmaster General to
make prohibitory orders when he suspects that the mail is being
used for the commission of criminal offences!' The Customs Tariffs
Act 31 enables the Crown to destroy prohibited importations which
include obscene material. There is even a provision in the Trade
Marks Act2 for the prohibition of trademarks for "scandalous,
obscene and/or immoral word or device."
33
At the provincial level legislation in all provinces deals with
the classification and censoring of films and videotapes.3 4 At the
municipal level there has been a recent proliferation of bylaws
attempting to regulate obscene material through zoning requirements
and bylaws regulating the sale of obscene material.35 The courts
have approved of the efforts of provincial and municipal
governments but often these efforts are thwarted by requirements
of constitutional law. The municipal governments cannot duplicate
the federal prohibitions for obvious constitutional reasons, and their
28BroadcastingAct Regulations, C.RIC., Vol. IV, c. 379, at 2559; C.RC., Vol. IV, c. 380 at
2582; C.R.C., Vol. IV, c. 381 at 2606.
29S.C. 1980-81-82, c. 54.
301bid. s. 41(1).
31 Customs Tariffs Act, S.C. 1985, c.12.
32 RtS.C. 1970, c. T-10.
3I1bid. s. 9(1)0).
3 4In Ontario this process is governed by the Theatres Act, S.O. 1984, c. 56; for a discussion
of provincial censorship laws see, N. Boyd, "Censorship and Obscenity:. Jurisdiction and the
Boundaries of Free Speech" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall IJ. at 37.
35For a listing of relevant municipal by-laws see, Mahoney, supra, note 1 at 100, n. 132.
Some cases that discuss the operation of these varied by-laws are Red Hot Video Ltd. v. City of
Vancouver (1985), 18 C.C.C. (3d) 153 (B.C.CA); Re Information Retailers Association of
Metropolitan Toronto (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (Ont. CA.); Re Hamilton Independent Variety
& Confectionary Stores Inc. and City of Hamilton (1983), 143 D.L.R. (3d) 498 (Ont. CA.); Re
Shalmark Hotels Ltd. (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 129, 121 D.L.R. (3d) 415 (Div. Ct.); Nordee
Investments v. Burlington (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 13 D.LR (4th) 37 (CA.); Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc. 105 S. Ct. 2794 (1985); American Booksellers Association Inc. v. Hudnut, 598
F.Supp. 1316 (1984), 771 F. 2d 232; aff'd 106 S. Ct. 1172; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
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attempts to carve out a unique jurisdiction for themselves have often
resulted in bylaws being struck down as void for vagueness
3 6
Nonetheless, the municipal governments have been persistent in
their efforts to join the fight.
The vast arsenal of legislative sanctions rely upon disparate
definitions of the targeted prohibited material - some statutes
proscribe obscene material while others proscribe indecent, immoral,
or scurrilous material. The inevitable result has been judicial
decisions that are confused and inconsistent in their application of
the varied statutory standards3 7 Not only has the legislature been
unresponsive to the problem of judicial inconsistency, but it has also
not been troubled by judicial pronouncements that standards such as
immoral and indecent are devoid of meaning and unduly vague.
The judiciary on many occasions has alerted the government to the
problem of vagueness;38 however, despite the implications that vague
prohibitions have for the principle of legality and the rule of law,
the legislature has not been moved to action in the absence of
judicial invalidation of the statute.3 9
It may appear odd that a war could be conducted without
effective coordination, but the legislatures seem to believe that
inconsistent sanctioning is the best defence as presumably this
uncertainty will keep the enemy offguard. The central question that
must now be addressed is how the judiciary will respond to the
public pressures to "get tough" with violators of the obscenity laws.
36See cases cited supra, note 35.
3 7For a selection of cases struggling with different standards see, Priape Engineering et. al.
v. Dep. Min. of Revenue (1979), 24 C.R. (3d) 66 ( Que. S.C.); R. v. Pei-Yuan (1973), 20 C.R.N.S.
37 (B.C. Co. Ct.); P, v. Daylight (1972), 18 C.R.N.S. 369 (Sask. Mag. Ct.); R v. 294555 LtcL
(1978), 39 C.C.C. (2d) 352 (Ont. CA.); R. v. Pelletier (1985), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 77 (Que. S.C.);
Johnson v. R. (1974), 40 D.L.RI (3d) 215 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pink Triangle Press (1979), 45 C.C.C.
(2d) 385 (Ont. Prov. Ct.), rev'd by 51 C.C.C. (2d) 485 (Co. Ct.) and 58 C.C.C. (2d) 505 (CA.).
38See, e.g., Pink Triangle, supra, note 37; P, v. Cinema International (1981) 13 Man. R (2d)
335 (C.A.); R. v. Glassman (1986) 53 C.R. (3d) 164 (Ont. Prov. Ct.); R v. Doug Rankine Co.
Ltd. (1983) 36 C.R (3d) 154 at 173 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
3 9For example, in Reference Re Luscher and Dep. Min. Rev. Cda. (1985) 45 CR. (3d) 81
(F.CA) the court invalidated a provision of the Customs TariffAct that proscribed immoral and
indecent material. Despite the usual "legislative inertia" Parliament was able to respond to this
invalidation within 3 months by amending the legislation so that it incorporated the Criminal
Code definition of obscenity.
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Is it possible for the judiciary to remain neutral and impartial in the
face of mounting pressure? How can the courts apply laws
consistently when the laws are replete with legislative inconsistencies
and unanswered questions?
II. THE HARM PRINCIPLE AS A LIMITING PRINCIPLE
The judiciary has three options to choose from in responding
to the problem of applying obscenity laws. First, the courts could
maintain a stance of complacency and merely apply the law without
endeavoring to infuse consistency and coherency into the process.
Second, the courts could undertake to refine the norm by clarifying
the scope of the sanction and by providing guidelines as to when
material falls beyond the pale. Third, the court could leave the
norm intact in its rather confused state, but then offset the potential
injustice that may arise by applying defences and interpreting
culpability in a liberal and remedial manner. The first option is
rejected for it fails to take the requirements of principled
adjudication seriously. The third option is a viable one; however, it
is best not to distort general principles of culpabililty for particular
offences except as a last resort if clarification and refinement of the
norm is impossible. Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss the
potential success of the second option before turning to the
discussion of defences.
The process of judicial refinement of a norm is not a
mechanical exercise. For the most part we have abandoned the
notion that adjudication is completely rule-governed in that all cases
can be determinately resolved by a syllogistic application of rules.
40
We recognize that any given rule can give rise to a prenumbral area
4 0There are few writers, if any, who would contend that law is a system of gapless,
determinate rules. This belief was laid to rest by the legal realists. For a useful discussion of
the realist movement and its progeny, see, J. Singer, "The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Theory" (1984) 94 Yale .J. 1; J. Stick, "Can Nihilism be Pragmatic?" (1986) 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 332; G. Peller, 'The Metaphysics of American Law" (1985) 73 Calif. L Rev. 1151. But,
one need not be a radical theorist to reject the theory of the determinancy of rules: see 0. Fiss,
"Objectivity and Interpretation" (1982) 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 for a moderate view on the lack of
determinancy within a body of law.
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of uncertainty41 and at this point the great debate sets in as to how
judicial decisions are constrained in this area of boundless possibility.
There may be many considerations that operate to constrain and
structure judicial discretion and without claiming primacy for any
given consideration it is submitted that adjudicative discretion is
commonly constrained by the application of general principles that
have been given weight through the process of historical accretion.
The exercise is one of securing coherence of the rules within the
gravitational pull of these principles.42 Through such an exercise the
courts may achieve the refinement and clarification of a legislative
norm.
One principle that has an established historical pedigree, and
that is directly relevant to the obscenity issue, may be called the
"harm principle". Liberal political theory has constructed liberty-
limiting principles to define the legitimate occasions for legislative
proscription of conduct. Liberal legality advocates the harm
principle, that is, that legislative intervention can only be justified on
the basis of preventing harm. Harm is an elusive concept. It is
naive to believe that Mill's dichotomy of self-regarding versus other-
regarding harm43 is an acceptable starting point. Harm may be
defined deontologically as conduct impairing welfare interests or
foundational interests that are not contingent upon social
recognition.44 Or harm may be defined in a utilitarian fashion as
impairment of legally recognized interests that find recognition on
the basis of social utility.45 Under either formulation there have
41 H.LA. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) at 132.
42See, IKM. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) at 110-23; for
a general discussion of coherence theories of moral and legal reasoning see M. Hanen,
"Justification as Coherence" in M. Stewart. ed., Law, Morality and Rights (Hingham, MA.:
Klever Boston Inc., 1983); K.J. Kress, "Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's
Rights Thesis, Retroactivity and the Linear Order of Decisions" (1984) 72 Calif. L. Rev. 369;
Stick, supra, note 40.
431S. Mill, On Liberty, ed. by K. McCallum (Oxford: Blackwell, 1946) at 8-13.
44J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (New York. Oxford Univ. Press, 1984) at 31-43, 55-64; J.
Kleinig, "Crime and the Concept of Harm" (1978) 15 Am. Phil. Q. 27.
4 5A. Eser, The Principle of Harm in the Concept of Crime" (1965-66) 4 Duq. L. Rev. 345
at 376-417.
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
been four basic groups of harms that have been historically
recognized: 1) violation of interest in retaining or maintaining what
one is entitled to have (i.e. life, liberty, security, and property); 2)
offences to sensibility; 3) impairment of collective welfare; 4)
violation of some governmental interest.4 6 The intractable problem
presented by obscenity is that justification for the prohibition
through criminal sanction has been presented by claiming that
obscenity engages all, or some combination, of this group of four
recognized harms.
It matters not whether we adopt Mill's conception of the
harm principle or whether we expand his notion of liberal legality to
encompass legal paternalism, legal moralism, or perfectionism.47
Under any conception it is still necessary for the legislature to
identify some discrete harm which can justify the use of state
coercion. In the context of obscenity there are two approaches that
the judiciary can adopt to insure compliance with the harm principle.
Judicial review of legislation may be warranted if " a)... the outlawed
conduct is essentially not capable or likely to do any harm to legal
interests, and b) the outlawed conduct is generally capable of doing
harm, but in the specific case at bar the proscribed harm was in fact
not accomplished."'4 The first situation calls for judicial invalidation
and the second situation is an interpretive exercise calling for the
reading down of the statute so as not to capture the marginal
conduct.
In this country it is debatable as to whether the judiciary is
empowered to invalidate legislation that outlaws harmless conduct,
but even if the courts could invalidate the obscenity provisions it is
doubtful that they would find that these provisions refer to conduct
that is essentially not capable of doing harm. Despite the lack of
consensus on harm the court would probably adopt the deferential
46H. Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979) at 119-22.
47See Feinberg, supra, note 44 at 12-13 for definitions of these terms: legal paternalism -
- "it is reasonably necessary to prevent harm to the very person it prohibits from acting, as
opposed to others"; legal moralism - "it is reasonably necessary to prevent inherently immoral
conduct whether or not such conduct is harmful or offensive to anyone;" perfectionism (at 27) -
- "it is always a good reason in support of a proposed prohibition that it is probably necessary
for the improvement (elevation, perfection) of the character."
48Eser, supra, note 45 at 415.
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approach of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding obscenity: "it is not
for us to resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation...
from the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and judges have
acted on various unprovable assumptions. 49 The difficulty posed by
obscenity is not the total absence of potential harm, but the myriad
harms it purports to engage. It may not be the traditional function
of a court to resolve the debate as to whether obscenity causes
crime, or whether obscenity contributes to the subjugation of
women, or whether obscenity endangers our moral fibre - but in
interpreting the rather bald proscriptions contained in the Criminal
Code and elsewhere is it possible for the judiciary to fasten upon
one discrete harm to employ as an interpretive guide in determining
whether or not a given fact situation is properly captured by the
prohibition?O
An identification of the perceived harm that underlies a
criminal prohibition is an essential requirement for principled
adjudication that can extend beyond a sterile, formal application of
the statute. It is the belief of some positivist theorists, that
legislative rules operate rather independently of their justifying
reasons, and as such the courts need not resort to examining the
justifications for the creation of offences (i.e. the harm principle).
Joseph Raz concludes:
Thus norms have a relative independence from the reasons which justify them. In
order to know that a norm is valid we must know that there are reasons which justify
it. But we need not know whatthese reasons are in order to apply the norm
correctly to the majority of cases.
This formal approach to adjudication may be acceptable for
offences that are simply formulated and which clearly identify the
nature of the perceived harm. However, not all offences are framed
49Paris Adult Theatre I et. al. v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-1 (1972); see, also R. v. Langevin
(1984), 11 C.C.C. (3d) 336 (Ont. CA.) in which the court would not give effect to the argument
that the dangerous offender provisions of the Code are unconstitutional in light of studies that
show that it is impossible to have accurate psychiatric predictions of dangerousness.
50Although it may not be explicitly stated, the judiciary is constantly revising the scope of
criminal offences to render them coherent with the harm principle. For example, see the
reasoning in Skoke-Graham et. al. v. R. (1985), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.) and DiPietro and
DiPietro v. R. (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 100 (S.C.C.).
51J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975) at 79.
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in a canonical text that precludes any re-examination of its justifying
reasons.
The definition of obscenity is so imprecise that review of its
justifying reasons is necessary. Obscenity is currently defined as:
any publication a dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex,
or of sex and any one or more of the following subects, namely, crime, horror,
cruelty and violence, shall be deemed 
to be obscene.  
It is obvious that "dominant" and "undue" do not lend themselves
to quantifiable analysis. Without the aid of some judicial algorithmic
analysis the court will be faced with making evaluations that are not
guided by discernable standards. Due to the fact that the activity
prohibited - some form of publication - has a legitimate component,
the court must recognize that this type of prohibition must be
interpreted in an underinclusive manner53 so as to insure that
legitimate publications are not captured. To some, a distinction can
be drawn between legitimate and illegitimate publications on the
basis of artistic purpose, yet this is surely far too subjective and
impressionistic a guide for making any meaningful separation. The
court is not trained in aesthetic theory - it can only lay claim to
training in legal theory. The only precise and justified barometer of
legitimacy would be to interpret the definition in light of the harm
principle - a publication is only to be prohibited if it gives rise to
the possibility of harm. This task is easier said than done. How can
the harm principle operate as a coherent adjudicative constraint
when there is a choice of available harms? The interpretation of
the definition will vary depending upon whether the court perceives
the harm involved as causing crime, corrupting morals, advocating
misogyny, or damaging the "tone of society, the mode, or...the style
and quality of life.''M
52S. 159(8).
53 Commission, supra, note 17 at 360-63.
54A. Bickel, "Concurring and Dissenting Opinions" (1971) 22 Pub. Interest 25-26.
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A. The Community Standards Test as a Proxy for Harm
The phrase "dominant characteristic of which is the undue
exploitation of sex" is not self-executing and requires further judicial
elaboration. It is difficult to know how a court could elaborate
upon this phrase without a firm understanding of the harm sought
to be prevented. The older common-law definition of obscenity,
which has been replaced by the statutory formulation of "dominant
characteristic...", contained within its terms an indication of the
perceived harm. The Hicklin test was as follows: "whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and
corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influence and
into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."55 One may
disagree with the assumption regarding the type of harm suggested
by this test, but at least it was clear that the definition sought to
protect against the harm of moral depravity in the hands of those
who may be vulnerable to this influence. The Hicklin test was
attacked and ultimately rejected for five reasons: 1) it was vague in
meaning and thus subjective in application; 2) the test was only
concerned with the effect on the most vulnerable individual; 3)
expert evidence was considered inadmissable; 4) there was no
defence of artistic merit and 5) in the application of the test, the
judges needed only to look at part of the material, not the whole.
An examination of the case law reveals that these five deficiencies
are still inherent in the new definition.
The Supreme Court quickly attempted to give the statutory
definition content that was capable of judicial application. Two tests
emerged to elucidate the statutory test. In R. v. Brodie,56 the Lady
Chatterley's Lover case, the court created the "internal necessities
test" and the "community standards test." The internal necessities
test requires an examination of artistic purpose to determine if the
treatment of sexual content is necessitated by the aesthetic design
of the publication. Being uncomfortable with playing the role of
55Pv. ic.in (1868), L.R 3 Q.B. 360.
56P, v. Brodie (1962), 132 C.C.C. 161, 32 D.L.R (2d) 507.
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
literary or dramatic critic the courts have decided few cases on the
basis of this test.
The true flavour of the obscenity prohibition is not found in
the evaluation of artistic design but in the application of the
community standards test. There had been some doubt as to the
scope of the application of this test but recently the Supreme Court
of Canada has confirmed that the community standards test is the
appropriate standard for all manner of obscene material and
performances that are proscribed by the Criminal Code.s7 In theory,
the community standards test developed to provide some measure of
what is considered "undue" exploitation for the purposes of the
statutory definition of obscenity found in s.159(8). The test was
designed to insulate the judiciary from the obvious criticism that
their application of the statutory definition was just as subjective as
their application of the common law Hicklin standard.
Judicial application of the standard is characterized by the
recitation of endless platitudes used to demonstrate that the
standard is objective and neutral. Judges have stated that "those
standards are not set by those of lowest taste or interest"58 and that
"I am required to judge as objectively as possible, only on the basis
of what I perceive the community standards of tolerance to be."
59
When a judge inadvertantly allows some suggestion of subjective
application to slip into his reasons his decision will be subject to
appellate reversal. In Towne Cinema Theatres v. R.,60 the Supreme
Court of Canada reprimanded the trial judge for commenting that
"...I do not feel that I am imposing my own standards completely,
although how can one help but be subjective in a case like this?"61
Few people are fooled by the self-serving assertions of
objectivity. In light of the inconsistencies in judicial application of
the standard it is not surprising that this branch of the law deserves
5 7Germain v. R. (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
58R v. Dominion News and Gifts Ltd. [1963], 2 C.C.C. 103 at 116 (Man. CA.).
59R. v. Ramsingh et. al. (1984), 14 C.C.C. (3d) 230 at 240 (Man. Q.B.).
60Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. R? (1985), 45 C.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
61bid. at 18.
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the epithet of the "most muddled law in Canada."62 Commentators
are quick to point out that "however much the learned judges pay
lip service to the jargon of artistic merit and community standards,
they, in effect, merely decide the issues on their own gut
reactions. 63 This form of criticism does not only emanate from the
pens of expectantly critical academics but even members of the
judiciary have had occasion to comment that "the lack of unanimity
in the decision of the courts in obscenity suggests that the Canadian
contemporary community standard may very well be a very elusive,
not readily discernable, and ill defined standard. ''c5 4
There are two approaches that the judiciary can adopt to
ameliorate the vague and subjective nature of the standard. The
court can arbitrarily designate specific depictions as obscene and
through the designation achieve an underinclusive but certain
category of obscenity. Alternatively, the court can employ the "harm
principle" to delineate a class of material that should be suppressed.
The arbitrary designation of specified depictions is an
attractive solution to problems of vagueness, 65  as arbitrary
specification may be capable of instantiating the community
standards test. There is little likelihood, however, of achieving
judicial consensus as to what should be designated. Courts have
readily agreed that depictions of juveniles or depictions of severe
cruelty in the context of sexual acts exceeds community standards.6
Outside of this narrow band of agreement the courts have failed to
generate a consistent approach. A recent attempt to designate
specific depictions that conform to the community standard went as
follows:
62D.A. Schmeiser, Civil Liberties in Canada (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964) at 232.
6 3 M. Tadman, "Obscenity, Civil Liberty and the Law" (1970-72) 38 Man. B. News 313 at
315.
4Cincma International, supra, note 38 at 342.
6 5 in fact, this has been the approach of both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Fraser
Committee. The U.S. Supreme Ct. requires legislation to specify types of sexual conduct that
are presumed to appeal to the prurient interest and it is this specification that will salvage a
statute from being struck down as constitutionally vague.
6 6 Committee, supra, note 14 at 116.
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Contemporary community standards would tolerate the distribution of films which
consist substantially in scenes of people engaged in sewal intercourse...scencs of
group sex, lesbianism, fellatio, cunnilingus and anal sex.
Some courts found this line-drawing convincing6 and this augured
well for the process of fleshing out the community standards test;
however, other courts simply ignored this development and
continued to apply their conception of the community standard. In
one case the judge found obscenity to lie in a magazine "concerned
with the sexual activity of a man and woman from foreplay to
orgasm" even though they were "in no way unnatural or unlawful
and, indeed.., are a common part of the lives of Canadian men and
woman."69 It is common for courts to find material to exceed
community standards in cases when it depicts the exact conduct that
the court above deemed to be acceptable. 70 There is little hope of
curing the vagueness of the community standards test by arbitrary
designations so we must determine the viability of a more purposive
approach.
This more purposive approach entails the application of the
community standards test in a manner consistent with the harm
principle. As indicated earlier, judicial application of the harm
principle should result in the demarcation of a zone of legitimate
publication and a zone of properly proscribed and presumably
dangerous material. Courts have struggled with the interpretive
weight to be given to the harm principle, but due to the lack of
certainty regarding harm the courts have been unable to generate
a constructive approach. The current elaboration of the community
standards test does not explicitly incorporate the principle of harm
67R v. Doug Rankine Co. (1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 54, 70 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
68he Rankine case has been followed in Rarnsingh, supra, note 59; R. v. Video World
(1985), 32 Man. R. (2d) 41 (Man. Prov. Ct.), reversed on appeal 36 Man. R. (2d) 68, 22 C.C.C.
(3d) 331 (Man. CA.).
69 Reference Re Luscher and Dep. Min. Rev. Cda. (1983), 149 D.LtR (3d) 243 at 245 (B.C.
Co. Ct.).
7 0 For examples of cases in which obscenity was found in depictions of sexual activity of
consenting heterosexuals see, R, v. Video World (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 331 (Man. CA.); R. v.
Wagner (1985), 43 C.R (3d) 318 (Alta. Q.B.); R. v. St. John News (1982), 47 N.B.R. (2d) 91, 124
A.P.Rt 91 (N.B.Q.B.).
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- the test merely serves as a substitute or proxy for a conclusive
finding of harm. The test has recently been formulated by the
Supreme Court of Canada as follows:
The cases all emphasize that it is a standard of tolerance, not taste, that is relevant.
What matters is not what Canadians think is right for themselves to see. What
matters is what Canadians would not abide other Canadians seeing because it would
bepeyond the contemporary Canadian standard of tolerance to allow them to see
it.7
The decision of what the community will tolerate may be
based upon considerations that have little to do with harm to the
community. It may be based upon a misguided sense of paternalism.
Or, it may be based upon a Utopian vision of the ideal community.
The development of a community standard of tolerance may be
essential to defeat claims of subjective application of the law based
upon individual tastes, but it has little to do with confining criminal
prohibitions to protect against the harm for which the prohibition
was established. The community standards test is not even an
adequate safeguard against subjective application of the law because
the Supreme Court of Canada has confirmed that the standard need
not be proved by expert evidence 72 - trial judges are free to draw
their own conclusions concerning a community's level of tolerance.
At its worst this test is one of subjective application that is not
confined to the purposes for which the legislation was designed.
Application of the harm principle is easier said than done
because the obscenity prohibitions purport to be supported by a
myriad of potential harms. Thus, a court is faced with the threshold
question of which harm to choose for interpretive purposes.
Nevertheless, the courts rarely engage in this threshold
determination because they are inclined to dismiss the interpretive
exercise as irrelevant. For example, the traditional liberal
justification for obscenity prohibition is harm to others as based
upon a narrow conception of harm, that is restricted to injury to
life, liberty, security, or property; yet when a court attempted to
resolve the issue of community standards by reference to this liberal
71 Towne Cinema, supra, note 60 at 17.
72 1n Towne Cinema 5 of 7 judges agree that it is not necessary to call expert evidence to
prove the relevant community standard.
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conception of harm it was reversed upon appeal. The Manitoba
Provincial Court dismissed charges concluding that "there is no
evidence before me as to any adverse societal influence the films
before me have."73 The Court of Appeal simply responded that "it
is unnecessary for us, in this case, to consider the question of
adverse societal influences.
74
The traditional conservative justification for prohibition based
upon perceived harm to the moral development of the community
has not fared any better. It has been held that "it is neither helpful
nor accurate to say that the community standard of tolerance is
synonymous with the moral standards of the community."75 Further,
the Supreme Court of Canada has recently disapproved of a
direction that states: "I consider that the following articles offered
for sale by the accused are likely to offend the innate sense of
morality of the average Canadian and constitute an undue
exploitation of sex."76 The courts may believe that it is justified for
Parliament to proscribe conduct on the basis of harm to others or
on the basis of the denigration of community morality, yet it is
surprising that they are reluctant to employ these justifying principles
to give further content to an amorphous prohibition.
Another justification for the proscription of obscenity equates
obscenity laws with public nuisance law. Obscenity is to be
prohibited because it may shock the unwilling observer and thus
create unnecessary emotional upset. If this be the underlying
rationale a more regulatory law is required. A distinction would be
drawn between inherent and circumstantial obscenity77 with the
result being that some materials would be insulated from a finding
of obscenity because they had only been distributed or viewed by
willing participants. Not all courts drew this distinction but there
are numerous judgments in which the courts refused to apply
73 Video World, supra, note 68 at 54.
74 Video World, supra, note 70 at 342.
75A v. Penthouse Int. Ltd. (1979), 46 C.C.C. (2d) 111 at 114 (Ont. CA.).
76Gerinain v. R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 241 at 251, 21 C.C.C. (3d) 289.
77See RG. Fox, Obscenity, (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission, 1972) at 45-49.
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sanctions because the viewers were not upset by the presentation
78
or because the manner of distribution insured that the material
would not be thrust upon a captive audience.
79
Resort to the principle of offence to others lends some
determinacy to the community standards test. It suggests that there
is a zone of materials inherently obscene (and as suggested earlier,
this would coincide with the materials for which there has been
reached judicial consensus, such as depictions of juveniles and
depictions of cruelty or violence and sex), and then for the bulk of
material the test would require balancing of all the factors outlined
by the Ontario Court of Appeal. Not only is this approach more
structured but it coheres with the oft quoted judicial aphorism that
"tolerance is to be preferred to proscription."80 Unfortunately, this
principle has also been peremptorily dismissed by the Supreme
Court of Canada. In Towne Cinema, Wilson J. concluded that
manner of distribution and exhibition is irrelevant because it
introduces uncertainty into the law and detracts from the formation
of a truly national standard81 More recently the Supreme Court of
Canada recognized that there is a distinction between private and
public obscenity but held that the Towne Cinema case precluded
application of factors relating to distribution and the type of
audience that is viewing the material.8 2 The Court has even gone
so far as to suggest that the making of a photograph with no further
intention to publish or distribute is captured by the obscenity
provisions.8
3
78R v. Vigue (1973), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 381 (B.C. Prov. Ct.); R v. Kleppe (1977, 35 C.C.C. (2d)
168 (Ont. Prov. Ct.); R v. Heathcote, unreported, Ont. Prov. Ct., July 1982; R. v. Gray (1982),
65 C.C.C. (2d) 353 (Ont. H.C.).
79P, v. Seguin, [1969] 2 C.C.C. 150 (Ont. Co. Ct.); R v. Reilly (1970), 1 C.CC (2d) 24 (Ont.
Co. Ct.); R. v. MacMillan (1977), 31 C.C.C. (2d) 286 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
8 0Doninion News and Gifts, supra, note 58 at 117.
8 1 Towne Cinema, supra, note 60 at 29-30.
8 2 Gemzain, supra, note 76 at 250.
83Hawkshaw v. P, (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.)
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Despite the failure of the courts to endorse a particular
conception of harm that can serve as a principle of interpretive
value, the Supreme Court of Canada is painfully aware of the fact
that the community standards test does not necessarily embrace the
justification for having an obscenity prohibition. In Towne Cinema,
Dickson C.J.C. commented:
Ours is not a perfect society and it is unfortunate but true that the community may
tolerate publications that cause harm to members of society and therefore to society
as a whole. Even if, at certain times, there is a coincidence between what is not
tolerated and what is harmful to society, there is no necessary connection between
these two concepts. Thus, a legal definition of "undue" must encompW publications
harmful to members of society, and therefore to society as a whole.
The recognition of the lack of coincidence between a
community standard of tolerance and the harm principle has not led
the court to the conclusion that this standard must be rejected and
replaced with a more apposite test. The judicial response has been
to retain the current test and to supplement the test with another
test that attempts to incorporate the newest perceived harm - the
feminist conception of harm. Dickson C.J.C. indicated the nature of
this supplementary test by stating:
Even if certain sex-related materials were found to be within the standard of
tolerance of the community, it would still be necessary to ensure that they were not
"undue" in some other sense, for example, in the sense that they portray persons in
a degradingmanner as objects of violence, cruelty, or other forms of dehumanizing
treatment."
Other courts have followed the same road. The B.C. Court of
Appeal has held that "explicit sex portraying human beings as having
animal characteristics results in substantial harm to the community...
(and it) tends to dehumanize and degrade men and woman in an
excessive and revolting way."8 6 Similarly, it is common now for courts
to formulate the relevant test in terms of "degrading and
84Towne Cinema, supra, note 60 at 14.
8 51bid. at 15.
86P v. Red Hot Video (1985), 45 C.Rt (3d) 36, at 59 (B.C.C.A.).
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dehumanizing s 7  or portrayals of people as "having animal
characteristics."
88
The fact that the court has undertaken to supplement the
current standard with another standard has led to the explication of
current obscurities by resort to even greater obscurity. The court
has adopted the legislative mentality of increasing the artillery
instead of trying to justify current resources. It is unrealistic to
expect the judiciary to be completely isolated from social and
political developments; however, the current war on obscenity does
not lend itself to active judicial assistance. The judiciary has been
called upon to apply a law that is open-ended and textually muddled,
and the courts should step back from the political objective of
eradicating obscenity and take as its first responsibility the
clarification and rationalization of the law.
The principle of legality or the rule of law demands that a
law be ascertainable in order to serve the function of guiding
citizens in conducting their affairs.89  Can it be truly said that
community standards of tolerance designates in an accessible way a
pattern of behaviour to which the citizen can conform? By virtue of
this standard we have a law that states that you are guilty of a
criminal offence if the community decides that you have gone too
far. The decision of the community as to what behaviour is
manifestly criminal 9 may have reflected an accessible standard in
days gone by, but in a pluralistic society of great social complexity
can a community's assessment of behaviour deserving of sanction
serve as an accessible and authoritative standard?
In response to the suggestion that the community standard
test is unduly vague and cannot guide the citizen the court has
responded by stating that "the fact of the matter is that in all cases
8 7Rainsingh, supra, note 59 at 240.
88Wagner, supra, note 70 at 331.
8 9 F. Hayek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University
Microfilms, 1955), Lect. III; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1971) at 235-43; J. Raz, The Authority of Law (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979), ch.
11.
90See G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Toronto: Little Brown, 1978) at 115-235 for
a discussion of the concept of manifest criminality.
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cited to us by both counsel the courts found no difficulty in applying
the community standards rule."91 Surely, the issue is not the ease
with which the court can apply the standard, but rather if the
standard can be ascertained by the citizen in advance. Judges may
jokingly endorse Potter Stewart's prophetic claim that "I know it
when I see it";92 yet, I am certain that the citizen accused and
convicted of exceeding the community standard does not see the
humour in a law that defies articulation and can only be applied
through an intuitive response.
The inherent vagueness of the law has triggered
constitutional challenges but the courts have generally adopted the
position that the community standards test, though lacking in
precision, is not so devoid of content as to be constitutionally
invalid.93 The validity of the law is upheld, the court conceding that
"[t]he law is not perfect. We cannot do perfect justice. '"94
Unquestionably the law is not perfect, nor will it ever attain
perfection, but this does not mean that the court should not aspire
to do "perfect justice." If the court is not willing to thwart the
political battle by declaring the law unconstitutional, and if the court
is unable to clarify the basic prohibitory norm, there still remains the
judicial obligation to do justice by insuring that this imperfect law
will only apply to those who are truly culpable.
The extent of judicial involvement in the political battle can
only be ascertained by examining if the judiciary has offset the
imperfect formulation of the law by countering with the protective
shield of a coherent and rational application of defences. We can
see that the second option, indicated above, of refining the norm is
unattainable, so we must address the viability of the third option -
the liberal and remedial application of defences. It has been said
that the "maintenance of the state's authority will obviously be
strengthened by an attitude of stringency towards defences and it
91Rcd Hot Video, supra, note 86 at 42.
92Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
93Red Hot Video, supra, note 86; Wagner, supra, note 70; Ransingh, supra, note 59.
94Red Hot ideo, supra, note 86 at 57.
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will be weakened by liberality towards them."95 The failure to give
effect to a defence that, without question negates the culpability of
the accused suggests that the judiciary is more concerned with
maintaining the authority and ambitions of the state. Conversly, the
liberal application of excuses and justifications suggests that the
judiciary is refusing to enter the political battle and is content to
exercise its mandate of doing individualized justice. Accordingly, "it
is important, therefore, for the purpose of gauging the strength of
the force of authority within the state, to determine the extent to
which the judiciary is willing to sustain a general defence."96 With
this in mind I now turn to the Metro News case to determine if the
courts have been inclined to soften the impact of the political battle
by restricting the application of the law to only those people who
are truly culpable.
B. The Battle of Sakura
The December 1984 edition of Penthouse magazine
contained a series of photographs by Japanese photographer, Akira
Ishigaki. In Metro News the Ontario Court of Appeal described the
photographs as depicting "young women bound by ropes with the
genitalia displayed. 97 These same photographs were included in the
March 1984 edition of Photo Magazine without complaint but their
inclusion in Penthouse generated nation-wide prosecution. Opinion
among experts was divided. Experts called on behalf of the Crown
concluded that the bondage imagery and the "eroticizing of a brutal
theme"93 rendered the photographs offensive and obscene. Experts
called by the defence spoke of fine artistry, extraordinary surrealist
imagery, and a Japanese tradition of ritualized violence.
As would be expected, judicial decisions regarding the
propriety of these pictures was divided. The Metro News case was
95McGinley, supra, note 3 at 284.
96Ibid. at 286.
9 7Metro News, supra, note 2 at 296.
9 8 Ibid. at 297.
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one in which the jury convicted; presumably they found the pictures
to exceed community standards. Subsequent to this case Jewers J.
of the Manitoba Queen's Bench acquitted on the basis that the
Crown had not discharged its burden of proving the nature of
obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt. 9  In the course of his
judgment Jewer J. commented on the discord amongst courts:
In Metro News a criminal jury of 12 persons found the photographs to be obscene;
in a criminal prosecution in Regina before a judge sitting without a jury, the
photographs were found to be obscene; and in Quy c, a criminal jury could not
agree as to whether the photographs were obscenel
v
Some have argued that the laws relating to obscenity are not
particularly harsh or burdensome:
The criminal enforcement of obscenity does not reveal a particularly drastic or harsh
measure of control. Less than three hundred Canadians are charged each yr with
the offence; those convicted are almost invariably fined for their conduct.
Accordingly, without the jeopardy of punitive sanctions, such as
imprisonment, some people may believe that we should not worry
about individualized justice. I am certain that those accused of this
crime do not find the matter to be trivial. Those who want to
challenge the charge will invariably be faced with substantial costs of
defence - think of the video storekeeper who has had 20-40 films
seized (a common occurrence) and must pay fees for his lawyer to
view the films and then at trial he must pay for the days it takes the
judge to view the films. On top of this the fines meted out are not
de minimis - for a defendant who pleaded guilty of distributing the
Sakura edition of Penthouse a fine of $2000 was ordered.102 In
addition pornography has become a much debated and controversial
topic and the increased visibility of conservative and feminist
viewpoints may result in greater social stigma being attached to the
conviction.
9 9 P, v. Arena Recreation Ltd., unreported decision of Manitoba Queen's Bench (Jan. 20,
1987).
1 0Ibid. at 12.
1 0 1 Boyd, supra, note 34 at 60.
102R v. Somerset Specialties Ltd., unreported decision of the Ontario District Court (18
November 1986).
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It is not surprising that inconsistent results have been
reached - the community standards test is a nebulous test that is not
properly anchored by the harm principle. In academic debates
inconsistency may be inconsequential, but in criminal trials a flesh
and blood participant suffers adverse consequences at the hands of
a law that defies consistent application. In the face of an imperfect
law we can only aspire to perfect justice by insuring that the court
takes into account all factors relating to the flesh and blood
participant in determining whether or not the individual has culpably
violated this open-ended law.
There are three types of individual that may be prosecuted
for this offence - producers, distributors, and retailers. For the
most part we do not initiate many prosecutions against producers or
manufacturers (who are arguably the most culpable participants) -
this may have nothing to do with an insidious exercise of police
discretion, but may simply be a product of the fact that most
obscene material is produced outside of Canada 03 Distributors and
the retailers who receive the materials from the distributors are the
targets of obscenity prosecutions, and this class of defendant ranges
from large-scale national distributors of periodicals and magazines to
a clerk employed part-time at a convenience store. The Metro News
case presents us with a fairly representative example of the type of
circumstances that bear upon the culpability of both distributors and
retailers.
Metro News is a corporation that distributes some 2,000
newspapers, magazines, and books - among them, Penthouse
magazine. For this magazine a special procedure is adopted in
which a "mock-up" of the magazine is submitted to the Prohibited
Importations Branch of Canada Customs for approval. The Sakura
edition of Penthouse was approved for distribution after four
changes had been made as a result of objections from Customs.
In addition to seeking approval from Customs, Metro News
has a practice of submitting "adult" magazines to the Ontario
Advisory Committee. This Committee was established by the trade
association, the Periodical Distributors of Canada, after the Attorney
General refused to revive a government committee that had
1 03 Committee, supra, note 14 at 87.
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previously served the function of screening adult magazines. This
trade association committee had examined over 6000 publications
since its creation in 1976,1°4 and it approved the Sakura edition of
Penthouse.
In Ontario there is a special police unit known as "Project P"
that deals with pornographic material. A special arrangement had
been reached between Project P and the Periodical Distributors of
Canada to the effect that if the police were investigating a particular
magazine it would notify the trade association so that the association
could withdraw the magazine from circulation. In this case the
police claimed that there were an unusual number of complaints
regarding the Sakura edition so they seized the magazine and laid
charges without first notifying the association of the investigation.
Clearly this accused exercised caution and restraint in the
distribution of adult magazines. As Martin J.A. commented in the
case:
I think a fair reading of his evidence is that he realized that there were certain risks
involved in the distribution of "adult" magazines. Mr. Neil also testified as to the
steps taken by the appellant to encourage retailers to display "adult" magazines such
as Penthouse in a responsible manner by placing them at least 5 feet above the floor
behind other magazinsbr "blinders" furnished by the appellant, so that the full
cover is not displayed.
In light of these considerations can it be said that the
accused deliberately and consciously violated the law? The normative
assumption underlying the requirement that an accused act culpably
is that "criminal liability is just only when it is for an intentional act
that illegitimately poses a threat of harm with which the law has
concerned itself."1°6 Criminal law can be distinguished from tort law
in a descriptive sense by the assertion that punishment for violation
104Arena Recreation, supra, note 99 at 20.
1 0 5Metro News, supra, note 2 at 295-96.
106Gross, supra, note 46 at 139. In addition to this principle of culpability Gross sets out
a principle of responsibility that states that "criminal liability is unjust if the one who is liable
was not able to choose effectively to act in a way that would avoid criminal liability, and
because of that he violated the law" (at 137).
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of criminal law involves an element of moral condemnation, 1° 7 and
that morally objectionable behaviour of an accused flows from the
fact that the individual has engaged in a deliberate violation of a
state order or decree. We structure criminal liability on an
assumption of free will or voluntary choice. Punishing individuals is
rationalized "as a price justly extracted because the criminal had a
fair opportunity beforehand to avoid liability to pay."1 8 Metro News
undertook to comply with the law and it is impossible to
characterize their actions as deliberate defiance. Did the accused
have a "fair opportunity to adjust their behaviour to the law''1°9 or
is this a case in which the accused, despite their best efforts to
respect the law, must be sacrificed to the public interest in pursuing
the war on obscenity?
Before turning to the response of the judiciary to this
representative scenario, it must be mentioned that the executive
branch has a role to play in mitigating the harshness of applying a
vague law to an accused who may lack the requisite culpability that
justifies the imposition of a criminal sanction. It is possible that the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion can operate to divert accused
persons from the criminal process in circumstances in which there
are serious doubts as to their culpability. In fact this rarely happens
because prosecutors are presented with the problem posed by the
fact that these arguably innocent persons are still in possession of
materials which are considered obscene. In light of this problem
there is little pre-trial screening and the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion is usually reserved for plea bargaining. If the accused
person is not considered culpable or deserving of punishment the
Crown is amenable to withdrawing the charge if it is still possible to
107See generally, H. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law" (1958) 23 Law and
Contemporary Problems 401; M. Cohen, "Moral Aspects of Criminal Law" (1940) 49 Yale LJ.
987; Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach (Ottawa:
Supply & Services, 1987) at 103-18; J.F. Stephens, History of the Criminal Law of England
(London: MacMillan & Co., 1883), vol. II, 75-93.
1 0 8 H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968)
at 23.
109Ibid. at 181: "thus a primary vindication of the principle of responsibility could rest on
the simple idea that unless a man has the capacity and a fair opportunity to adjust his
behaviour to the law its penalties ought not be applied to him".
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convict the accused's company - charges are regularly withdrawn in
consideration of guilty pleas by the corporate entity. This can
protect some accused persons from the stigma of criminal conviction,
but of course it can only be used for more economically
sophisticated persons - this form of plea bargaining cannot assist
the employees of retail stores who are arguably the least culpable
of all potential accused.
A second mechanism that can be employed by the executive
to deal with non-culpable offenders in possession of obscene
material is to resort to the in rem proceedings contemplated by s.160
of the Criminal Code. This section allows for the seizure and
ultimate destruction of materials that are determined to be obscene
- this section operates without the requirement of charging any
individuals and thus there is no need to determine the culpability of
any individual. Recently Judge Borins commented upon the benefits
of resort to s.160:
The second purpose of s.160 is to avoid the criminal law becoming a trap. I have
already spoken about the difficulties encountered by the courts in the application
of the "community standards" test, which has come to form the central variable of
the definition of obscenity in s.159(8). No member of the public can say with
certainty that material is obscene until the court, applying somewhat obscure
standards, has pronounced it so. However, criminal prosecutions could follow as,
if and when someone defied a s.160 declaration of obscenity and persisted in
marketing the obscene material. Under this regime a person would know when he
was on dangerous ground... [u]nder the present regime, the criminal law has become
a trap.... My view is that, until s.160 proceeding has placed a tract beyond the pale,
no criminal prosecution should be sustained.... For well over a century courts have
had difficulty in defining obscenity with precision. To condemn people to the stigma
of a criminal conviction for violating standards they cannot understand, construe and
apply is a serious thing to do in a nation which, by its ficent Charter of Rights, has
affirmed its dedication to fair trials and due process.W5
Despite its availability, s.160 is rarely invoked by the Crown.
In consultations before the Fraser Committee, law enforcement
officials claimed that because of limited resources they can only
proceed against "the worst of the material and that in these cases,
proceedings against the individual distributors or sellers seem more
appropriate and more likely to deter others than proceeding against
the material itself,111 This response is surely disingenuous because
1101, v. Nicols (1984), 43 C.R. (3d) 54 at 68-69 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
111Committee, supra, note 14 at 125.
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limited resources would in fact be more efficiently employed in an
in rem proceeding under s.160 in which there would be no need for
a court to involve itself in a lengthy examination into the
circumstances of the offender to determine if actus reus and mens
rea had been established. It is submitted that the executive cannot
be relied upon to employ protective mechanisms such as s.160
because they believe that "all is fair in love and war" - they have no
institutional incentives directing them to employ the least restrictive
and intrusive means. In Metro News the accused believed that it
would have been fairer to employ s.160 and they wrote to the
Attorney-General prior to the commencement of trial with respect
to their submission on the preferability of proceeding under s.160.
The response of the Attorney-General was curt and confrontational:
You appear to take the view that because your company has followed certain
management practices it would therefore be unfair or unjust for a court of law to
decide the issue. I and my Ministry have made it clear, again and again, that your
industry capppt exempt itself from the ordinary application of the Criminal Code
of Canada.Th
C. The Decision in Metro News
Metro News attempted to keep within the spirit of the law by
submitting the Sakura edition to various government and non-
government bodies, and upon receiving approval and in the belief
that the magazine complied with the Criminal Code it then
distributed. It is difficult to know what else the defendant could
have done other than discontinuing its distribution of all adult
magazines.
This would presumably insure that the company could not
run afoul of the law, but this posture of self-censorship should not
be the only safe method of insuring compliance with the law. If the
government chooses to regulate a given industry by prohibiting
certain aspects of the business it must clearly identify the
undesirable aspects so that the industry can attend to its business
concerns without fear of constant government intervention. A
regulated industry should not be required to close down its
11 2 Metro News, supra, note 2 at 331.
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operation simply because the government has chosen to regulate by
employing a prohibition that is so vague that the industry cannot
safely decide when it is being law-abiding and when it will encounter
legal difficulties. If the government decides as a matter of public
policy that it does not want magazine distributors to circulate any
type of adult magazine it should precisely say so instead of hoping
that this will be the result of regulation by vague prohibition. Of
course, the government does not want to specifically outlaw all adult
magazines because even with the growing public concern about
pornography there would be little public support for such an over-
inclusive law"1 3 and in fact such a law may even encounter resistance
as the public may view this as an unacceptable act of state intrusion.
Metro News should have been allowed to plea as a defence
to the criminal charge that it is not guilty because it did not intend
to violate the law. The company can concede that the Sakura
edition is obscene because it exceeds community standards, it can
concede that the law has been broken and that a wrongdoing has
occurred, but it should be permitted to claim that this wrongdoing
should not be attributed to itself. The company is responsible in a
causal sense for the wrongdoing but it is not responsible in the
sense of moral accountability. In short, the company should be
excused from liability.
Criminal liability is not determined by an open-ended inquiry
into culpability, but rather conventional legal discourse demands that
questions of culpability be artificially segmented into compartments
such as incapacity, excuse, justification, and absence of mens rea.
For obvious reasons, the categories of incapacity and justification are
irrelevant to the company's plea and the category of excuse is
problematic because of the general reluctance to admit ignorance of
the law as an excuse. By default, it would seem that the company's
plea would have the best chance for success by characterizing its
situation as one lacking mens rea.
In effect the company would be required to argue that as a
result of its diligent attempts to comply with the law it lacked a
blameworthy state of mind. As a result of advice received and
113Surveys conducted and noted in Committee, supra, note 14 at 89-92 and 103-05 suggest
that most people view "soft-porn" as acceptable.
338 [voi- 25 NO. 2
War On Obscenity
precautions taken the company would assert that it did not know
that the material it was distributing was obscene. The company,
however, was faced with a difficulty in making this plea due to the
presence of s.159(6) of the Criminal Code which states:
Where an accused is charged with an offence under subsection (1) the fact that the
accused was ignorant of the nature or presence of the matter, picture, model...or
other thing by means of or in relation to which the offence was committed is not a
defence to the charge.
Not only does this provision deem irrelevant the accused's
knowledge of the precise legal characterization of the material but
it goes further by removing any consideration of a mens rea
component of knowledge or material awareness.
As would be expected, the company challenged the
constitutional validity of this provision. Fortunately for the
company, the Supreme Court of Canada had recently decided that
it is a violation of s.7 of the Charter for Parliament to create an
offence of absolute liability that carries a potential penalty of
imprisonment upon conviction.114  Section 159 is punishable by
imprisonment and s.159(6) does introduce an element of absolute
liability by removing consideration of the knowledge component of
mens rea. The Court of Appeal for Ontario defined absolute
liability as an offence "in which it is not open to the accused to
avoid criminal liability on the ground that he acted under a
reasonable mistake of fact...."115 Once characterized in this manner,
it was easy for the court to conclude that s. 159(6) converted the
offence into one of absolute liability and as such it violated the
requirements of fundamental justice under the Charter. Accordingly,
s.159(6) was struck down and, as one commentator has said, "thus
far, the judgment has everything to commend itself.,
116
With this impediment removed, the company then needed to
establish that the mens rea requirement for this offence includes
knowledge (or wilful blindness) that the publication exceeds
community standards and is thus obscene. At a minimum, mens rea
1 1 4 Reference re S.94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act [1985], 2 S.C.R. 486 48 C.R. 289 (S.C.C.).
1 1 5 Metro News, supra, note 2 at 302-03.
116D. Stuart, "Metro News: Misplaced Objectivity" (1986) 53 C.R. (3d) at 333.
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commonly includes knowledge of the circumstances that comprise
the actus reus.117  It had to be argued that the defining
circumstances in this case included the assessment that the material
exceeded community standards.
In dealing with the proposition that an accused must know
that he is dealing in legally defined obscenity, the court decided:
1) Mens rea does not include knowledge that the
photographs exceeded community standards. The proposition that
mens rea does include this type of knowledge is not supported by
the caselaw.
2) The only defence open to an accused is that of reasonable
mistake of fact. Even if s.159 is considered a "true crime" it does
not follow that the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R.
v. Sault Ste. Marie118 requires that this offence be placed in the
highest category of offences which requires the Crown to prove full
mens rea (including honest but unreasonable mistake of fact) beyond
a reasonable doubt. The history of the provision and the present
language employed (i.e. the omission of the word "knowingly")
indicates "Parliament's clear intention to relieve the Crown of the
burden of proof with respect to mens rea."119 In other words, this
offence is one of strict liability in which the doing of the act prima
facie imports the offence and for this type of offence a mistake of
fact must be reasonable.
3) In claiming a reasonable mistake of fact, it is not open to
the accused to assert that he reasonably believed that the material
did not exceed community standards. The issue of undue
exploitation and community standards involves a "value judgement to
which the doctrine of mistake of fact is inapplicable. ' 120 The
accused's assessment of the applicability of community standards is
1 1 7Metro News, supra, note 2 at 309; see also, R v. Buzzanga and Durocher (1979), 49
C.C.C. (2d) 369 at 381 (Ont. CA.); R v. Sault Ste. Marie (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353, at 362
(s.C.C.).
118 v. Sault Ste. Marie, ibid..
1 1 9 Metro News, supra, note 2 at 316.
1201bid. at 321.
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a question of law and our criminal law does not admit of a defence
of mistake of law or reasonable mistake of law.
4) An accused cannot assert that he has been subject to an
abuse of process based upon the fact that a) the magazine was
approved by Canadian Customs; b) the photographs had appeared
earlier in a photography magazine without complaint or objection;
c) the magazine was approved by the trade association committee;
d) the Crown could have proceeded by way of a s.160 in rem
proceeding instead of charging a criminal offence.
These four interrelated propositions raise issues relating to the
doctrines of strict liability (#2), mistake of law (#1 and #3) and
officially-induced error (described as an abuse of process in #4).
The court's analysis of these three issues illustrates the intractable
difficulty of maintaining doctrinal purity in the midst of an ongoing
political battle.
III. STRICT LIABILITY
In the view of the Ontario Court of Appeal the offence of
distributing obscene material is one of strict liability. This
conclusion follows from the court's assertion that for this offence the
Crown need not prove mens rea and that a defence of reasonable
mistake of fact is open to the accused. Some mention is made of
the three categories of offences set out in the Sault Ste. Marie case
but never in the entire judgment does the court directly say that this
offence is one of strict liability. Perhaps the court is embarrassed by
its conclusion, or perhaps it just sounds too strained and odd to
speak of strict liability and obscenity in the same breath. In light of
the contemporary heated debate and the increasing political efforts
to finally rid us of this menace, it is indeed strange to put the
offence of obscenity in the same category as offences of trading in
unregistered securities, driving a motor vehicle without insurance,
failing to remit taxes withheld at source, and supplying liquor to one
apparently underage.
1 21
1 2 1 For a listing of offences classified as strict liability see, D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal
Law: A Treatise (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 172-73.
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As a result of the Sault Ste. Marie decision, we now operate
in a framework of three types of offences: true crimes, strict liability
offences, and absolute liability offences. The effect of the
categorization is clear - a true crime requires proof of mens rea,
strict liability presumes mens rea and allows conviction to be avoided
upon the accused proving due diligence or reasonable mistake of
law, and absolute liability removes virtually all pleas in defence
except for those relating to the voluntariness of the act. The effect
of the categorization may be clear; however, the threshold question
of how to categorize has never been reduced to a clear and
workable formula. Within Sault Ste. Marie there is an adumbration
of the applicable formula but before turning to this case it is helpful
to look at a miscellany of factors that have been relied on by the
courts.
Often a distinction is made on the basis of the subject matter
of the offence. A distinction is made between true crimes and
public welfare offences with the latter occupying the categories of
strict and absolute liability depending upon their statutory
formulation. If an activity is subject to outright prohibition this
suggests that the activity is considered intrinsically harmful and any
violation may subject the actor to moral condemnation - this is
considered a true crime. However, in the case of activities that are
not intrinsically harmful and may be an aspect of a larger, socially
useful enterprise then it is common to adopt a regulative approach
to the activity in lieu of the inflexible approach of prohibition -
these types of regulative offences are considered public welfare
offences.12 2 The dichotomy of prohibition and regulation may not be
a watertight division 123 but it does suggest that the obscenity offence
falls into the category of true crime. Obscenity is subject to
absolute prohibition 124 and although it may be argued that
prohibiting obscenity is one part of a larger enterprise of regulating
1 2 2 See analysis in Hill v. R. (1973), 14 C.C.C. (2d) 505 (S.C.C.).
123E. Colvin, Principles of Criminal Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 139.
124By rejecting the circumstantial approach to obscenity (see notes 35 and 122
accompanying text), the court cannot maintain that the provisions of the Criminal Code are
merely regulatory provisions that dictate time, place and manner requirements for the
distribution of obscenity.
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the film and publishing industry this argument is easily defeated
when one considers that the offence is included in a section of the
Cininal Code titled "Offences Tending to Corrupt Morals" and that
this section does not purport to regulate a discrete enterprise or
industry.
A distinction based upon subject matter is sometimes drawn
on the basis of a division of offences into mala in se and mala
prohibita. The latter category concerns activity that is only
considered harmful because a legislature has deemed it necessary to
prohibit in pursuance of some economic or social objective, whereas
the former category engages offences that are considered wrongful
based upon a shared community consensus. The justifications
commonly advanced for the prohibition of obscenity tend to support
its categorization as mala in se but the division into mala in se and
mala prohibita is too amorphous to be relied upon for the concrete
and significant task of determining the scope of allowable
defences 25 The failure to enunciate clear and precise criteria for
this distinction has resulted in a shift in focus from substantive
distinctions between true crimes and strict liability to a focus upon
formal distinctions. For example, "higher levels of penalty are likely
to be associated with mala in se and the lower levels with mala
prohibita.1 26
A formal criteria of classification based upon penalty level
has been alluded to in a number of cases. Punishments involving
mandatory prison terms or discretionary prison terms of two or five
years have been construed as indicating a Parliamentary intention to
designate the offence as a true crime requiring proof of mens rea.
127
The offence of obscenity is a hybrid offence that when processed as
indictable is subject to a discretionary maximum of two years. One
would have thought that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in R. v. Pue128 would be controlling - in that case Laskin
125Colvin, supra, note 123 at 140; Stuart, supra, note 121 at 162; Gross, supra, note 46 at
122-24.
126colvin, supra, note 123 at 142.
1 2 71bid. at 143.
128P, v. Prue; R. v. Baril, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 547, 8 C.1 (3d) 68 at 73.
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C.J.C. commented that "I should have thought that the fact that the
offence may be prosecuted on indictment and carries in that respect
a maximum two-year term of imprisonment would support the
application of the general principle....' 129 (in that case the principle
being that the offence of driving while disqualified is to be classified
as a true crime).
Two additional factors must be mentioned with respect to
penalty level. Firstly, the government has proposed legislation that
would raise the maximum sentence to five years; surely the
government would not even consider this quantum of sentence if it
believed obscenity was merely a public welfare offence. Secondly,
the courts have frequently looked at punitive consequences that
indirectly attach to conviction when determining if a specified
penalty is harsh enough to support a classification of an offence as
a true crime.130 For the offence of obscenity the relevant attendant
consequences include forfeiture of material and some degree of
stigma especially in light of mounting concern in the public domain.
It would seem on the formal criteria of penalty level there should be
little doubt that this offence falls into the first category of true
crime.
Other formal criteria include reference to statutory location
and constitutional origin. The former criteria refers to the
presumption that if the offence is included in the Criminal Code
then it is presumed to be a true crime requiring mens rea. As noted
in R. v. Prue, most offences included in the Criminal Code are
"outright prohibitions distinguishable from regulatory offences."131
The latter criteria refers to the presumption that provincial
legislation is commonly classified as strict or absolute liability
because only the federal government is empowered constitutionally
to enact true crimes. The upshot of these two presumptions is that
"the main area of uncertainty is that of federal offences outside the
1 2 91bid. at 553 or 72-73.
1 3 0 For example, R v. Chapin, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 121; R. v. Pierce Fisheries, [1971] S.C.R. 5.
131Prie, supra, note 128 at 553.
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Code."13 2 For provincial offences the usual debate revolves around
the issue of whether the offence is strict or absolute liability, for
non-Criminal Code federal offences the debate revolves around
classification as true crime or strict or absolute liability, but for
Criminal Code offences there is virtually no debate. -Once again as
indicated in the Prue case, "the inclusion of an offence in the
Criminal Code by that very fact must be taken to import mens rea,
and there would have to be a clear indication against it before a
court would be justified in denying its essentiality. 133 Despite the
weight of authority suggesting that the offence of obscenity is a true
crime, the Ontario Court of Appeal believed that there was a clear
indication to the contrary.
The court presented two reasons to support the surprising
conclusion that a Criminal Code offense is one of strict liability.
The reasons are loosely based upon some of the language used by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Sault Ste. Marie; however they
seem to be primarily based upon a misreading of this case.
First, the court held that "the act of distributing matter which
is in fact obscene prima facie imports the offence"134 and therefore
it is unnecessary to require the Crown to prove a mental element
that is self-evident. Reliance upon this assertion is nothing more
than a conclusion and not a supporting reason as the assertion itself
is nothing more than a description of the effect of classifying an
offence as strict liability. In this portion of the judgment the
Supreme Court of Canada was merely describing the fault
requirements of the three categories of offences once a particular
offence has been classified. The court was not suggesting that there
are offences for which the doing of the proscribed act logically
entails a concurrent presence of the required mental state. If such
offences existed then most crimes of general intent135 would fall into
this category and thus most Criminal Code offences would be
1 3 2 Colvin, supra, note 123 at 145.
1 3 3prue, supra, note 128 at 553.
1 3 4Metro News, supra, note 2 at 315.
1 3 5 General intent is discussed in Colvin, supra, note 123 at 97; Stuart, supra, note 121 at
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reclassified as strict liability offences. The Supreme Court of
Canada was not establishing a criteria of classification when it used
the words "the act prima facie imports the offence" - the criteria of
classification is actually found later on in the quoted portion of the
judgment when the court says that "public welfare would prima facie
be in the second category" unless there was language in the
enactment that indicates that the public welfare offence was to be
included in the category of true crime. If the offence under inquiry
is held to be a public welfare offence that does not contain language
suggesting elevation into the true crime category then and only then
can the court conclude that the doing of the act imports the
offence.
136
Second, the court of appeal concludes that this offence must
be strict liability because Parliament has omitted the word
"knowingly" in the offence of distributing obscenity but retained this
word in the companion offence of selling obscene material. There
are three difficulties with this conclusion. First, it appears that this
conclusion is also based upon a misreading of the test in Sault Ste.
Marie. Dickson J. (as he then was) notes that the importance of
words such as knowingly or willingly is that their presence may
indicate that a strict liability offence is to be considered a true crime
for which mens rea must be proved. He does not say anything
about the absence of these words in a Criminal Code provision for
obvious reasons. Most Criminal Code offences are silent with
respect to their mens rea components and to place importance upon
the absence of words triggering mens rea would result in the
reclassification of many offences as strict liability.
The second objection to the approach of the court is aptly
summarized by Glanville Williams:
The judges frequently claim that the absence of the word "knowingly" in a statute
is evidence that Parliament meant the offence to carry strict liability, but this is
obviously a non sequitur. Parliament may have left out "knowingly" because it was
1 3 6 That the phrase "the act prima facie imports the offence" is not to be considered a
criteria of classification but rather a statement of result is supported by Fletcher's claim that
"an alternative theory of strict liability is that it is not strict at all, merely that an element of
culpability need not be proven at trial ... because the occurrence of the objective event ... raises
a presumption of culpable neglect by the supervisory personnel", see, Fletcher, supra, note 90
at 717-18. Fletcher's reference to supervisory personnel is illuminating as it suggests that a
presumption of culpability is a necessary expedient only in the cases of offences committed by
corporate entities.
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not bothering itself about the fault requirement... or Parliament may have meant
that the offence can be committed knowingly or rec ylsly; or that it might have
meant that the offence can be committed negligently.
The third reason why the approach of the court is
problematic is that it represents a departure from past decisions of
the same court with respect to the issue of the significance of the
omission of a triggering word such as knowingly or willingly. In R.
v. Buzzanga,138 Martin J.A. (who is also the author of the decision
in Metro News) concluded that the omission of the word "willingly"
in s. 281.2(1) of the Criminal Code must not be taken to evidence
a legislative intention to oust the operation of mens rea, even
though the companion section, 281.2(2) specifically employs the
word "willfully." Martin J.A. states that "although no mental element
is expressly mentioned in s.281.2(1)...mens rea is, none the less,
required since the inclusion of an offence in the Criminal Code must
be taken to import mens rea in the absence of a clear intention to
the contrary."139 Accordingly, in Buzzanga, it was decided that if one
section omits reference to mens rea then a general form of mens
rea, intentional or reckless conduct, will be read into the section,
and that the companion section which employs the term "willfully"
will be interpreted to include only intentional conduct so as to
differentiate the mens rea components of a provision that mentions
mens rea from a provision that omits it. Applying the logic of
Buzzanga to the offence of distributing obscene material, the court
should have concluded that mens rea should be imported into the
section but in a form that is distinguishable from the mens rea
component of "knowingly" that is specifically mentioned in the
companion offence of selling obscene material.
When Martin J.A. expresses the opinion in Buzzanga that
Parliament can oust mens rea if it clearly expresses such an intention
he was not referring to the ambiguous omission of a word such as
"knowingly" or "willfully". Clear expressions of an intention to oust
137G. Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1983) at 935.
138(1979), 49 C.C.C. (2d) 369 (Ont. CA.).
1 3 91bid. at 381.
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mens rea are accomplished by direct language that indicates that
Parliament has turned its intention to this very issue.
140
Not only does the court rely upon the omission of the word
"knowingly" in s.159(1) to support its classification of this offence as
one of strict liability, but it also makes mention of the presence of
section 159(6). As previously discussed, this section specifically
excluded the defence of ignorance of the nature or presence of the
material, and the court invalidated this section as being contrary to
the Charter. It seems rather strange to resurrect an invalidated
provision for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intention. Even
if it is not incongruous to resurrect this unconstitutional provision
for interpretive purposes the court should not give effect to the
literal meaning of the section - it was this literal meaning that
violated the rights guaranteed by the Charter. This invalidated
provision cannot be taken at face value but perhaps some
significance could be given to its purpose, design, or spirit. It takes
little imagination to conclude that this impugned provision was
designed for the sake of administrative expediency as an aid to
enforcement, and if this be its design then the issue is whether
administrative expediency is a weighty enough reason to relegate an
offence in the Criminal Code to the status of an offence of strict
liability.
When the inclusion of s.159(6) was being debated in
Parliament the focus of discussion was on the issue of whether
requiring the Crown to prove knowledge would present itself as an
insurmountable obstacle to the enforcement of the obscenity
140Parliament is not unfamiliar with the technique of ousting mens rea - for example s.146
of the Code states:
146.(1) Every male person who has sexual intercourse with a female
person who
(a) is not his wife, and
(b) is under the age of fourteen years,
whether or not he believes that she is fourteen years of age or more,
is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for life.
Similarly, Parliament has also had experience in successfully expressing its intention to limit
considerations of mens rea to the defence of reasonable mistake of fact - for example, after
defining the constituent elements of the offence of bigamy in s.254 of the Code Parliament
clearly establishes that only the defence of reasonable mistake of fact will suffice:
254.(2) No person commits bigamy by going through a form of marriage if
(a) that person in good faith and on reasonable
grounds believes that his spouse is dead.
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provisions 41 At the time the Minister of Justice undertook to
consult with law enforcement agencies as to whether proof of mens
rea would present enforcement difficulties. He reported back to
Parliament with the conclusion that "the consensus is that section
207 as amended by the bill could not be enforced while the words
'knowingly, without lawful justification or excuse' remain, and that
these words should be deleted".14 2 One must question the wisdom
of relying upon the self-serving conclusions of law enforcement
officials as to the practical enforcement problems presented by
traditional mens rea analysis, but even so one must also question the
accuracy of these expressed concerns when one considers that at the
time the prosecution of obscenity had a conviction rate of 96%!4s
The courts have been reluctant to place much significance
upon the factor of administrative expediency in carrying out their
task of classifying offences. The Supreme Court of Canada has not
spoken in one voice but the weight of authority suggests that
perceived difficulty in enforcement is not a sufficient justification for
restricting the allowable defences that may be pleaded. To permit
the legislature to restrict the application of mens rea on the belief
that forensic inquiries into culpability will thwart prosecutions is
indeed a slippery slope - the concern over effective enforcement is
applicable to each and every offence found in the Criminal Code.144
1 41 Canada, H.C. Debates, vol. 1, 1st Sess., 21st Pan., (21 October 1949) at 1036-43; vol. 3,
1st Sess., 21st Parl. (5 December 1949) at 2687-99; vol. 4, 1st Sess., 22nd Parl., (2 April 1954)
at 3611-14.
1 4 2 Canada, H.C. Debates, vol. 2, 1st Sess., 21st Pan., (5 December 1949) at 2688-89.
1 43 Fox, supra, note 77 at 70.
144Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Strasser v. Roberge [1979] 2
S.C.R. 953, 50 C.C.C. (2d) 129 muddies the water with respect to the significance of
enforcement concerns. In this much criticized decision all seven members of the court agreed
that a particular offence under the Quebec Labour Code required proof of mens rea; however,
four members of the Court concluded that for a number of reasons this offence should be
classified as strict liability. One of the reasons advanced related to administrative expediency.
"In the great majority of cases to which the prohibition applies, it would be virtually impossible
for the prosecution to establish the existence of intent except through proof of the material
factor ... [i]f the prohibition is to be effective - and it must be assumed that the Act intends it
to be - the only method is to reverse the burden of proof and impose on the accused the
obligation of showing that he did not have the required intent and took reasonable steps to
avoid committing the offence." (p. 980).
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Administrative expediency is a dangerous justification because
it is overinclusive - it is an argument that can be advanced with
respect to any penal offence. One should approach considerations
of administrative expediency with skepticism and caution, and the
most recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on this issue
echoes the need for this skepticism:
Indeed, administrative expediency certainly has a place in administrative law. But
when administrative law chooses to call in aid imprisonment through penal law,
indeed sometimes criminal law and the added stigma attached to a conviction,
exceptional, in my view, will be the case where the libertYr4Vr even the security of the
person... will be sacrificed to administrative expediency.
For these reasons, the Ontario Court of Appeal's
classification of the offence of distributing obscenity as one of strict
liability is an unjustified departure from contemporary doctrinal
approaches to classification. The upshot of this erroneous
classification is quite remarkable. By limiting the scope of allowable
offence to reasonable mistake of fact the court has in effect stripped
an accused of any viable defence because it is virtually impossible to
plea reasonable mistake of fact to this offence. It is inconceivable
that someone could make a factual mistake as to the act of
distributing. A reasonable mistake of fact will only have practical
application if one could successfully plea that one had an honest and
reasonable belief that the material distributed did not exceed
community standards; however, the court closed this door by holding
that a belief concerning community standards is not a factual
mistake but rather a mistake of law and as such the accused is
barred from presenting his belief as an exculpatory factor. In their
zeal to aid enforcement by classifying the offence as strict liability
The minority of three judges endorsed the position earlier articulated in the Chapin case.
Dickson J. stated that in the Chapin case "mere difficulty of enforcement was considered hardly
enough to dislodge the offence from the category of strict liability and, in my view, the same
approach ought to be taken where the debate is between a mens rea offence and strict liability.
Mere difficulty of enforcement cannot justify the shifting of a burden of proof of the mental
element to the accused, for if that were the case one could easily justify doing away with the
presumption of mens rea and the presumption of innocence in criminal law proper" (p. 992).
It is submitted that this approach is the correct one, and that the majority position carries little
persuasive force. In fact, the majority had four reasons, other than administrative expediency,
to support their conclusion that the offence was one of strict liability, and the decision should
be limited to these other reasons.
145Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 114 at 321.
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the court has gone beyond simply tilting the balance in favour of
enforcement and has actually created an offence of perfect
enforceability that can operate as an assembly line form of justice
that need not take into account individualized standards of
culpability.
IV. MISTAKE OF LAW
The judicial treatment of the defence of mistake of law, is
also seriously flawed but unlike the skewed classification as strict
liability, the error with respect to mistake of law does not necessarily
warrant an accusation of craft failure or partiality. The court's
approach to the issue of mistake of law is flawed not because of a
cavalier disregard of existing and well-settled doctrine but because
the court has chosen the path of least resistance by meekly
endorsing the doctrinal status quo despite the existence of a
persuasive body of literature that calls for reform of the doctrine.
In other words the court can only be faulted for not being bold or
perhaps, in a more disparaging tone, for being complacent.
The court rejected the accused's plea that it should not be
convicted because it entertained an honest and reasonable belief
that the material did not exceed community standards. It should be
noted that the rejection of this plea would be applicable not only to
distributor but also to retail sellers. The plea was disallowed for the
following reasons:
1) Most of the caselaw supports the proposition that mens
rea does not include knowledge that the matter alleged to be
obscene exceeds community standards.
2) The invalidated provision, s.159(6), clearly indicates that
Parliament intended that this plea not be allowed.
3) Knowledge of community standards does not engage a
question of fact but rather it concerns a value judgement and as
such it is more properly characterized as a question of law for which
no mistake is excusable.
The third factor is the most relevant because it is this
characterization as mistake of law that in turn lends support to the
large body of caselaw that has rejected this plea. Ignorance of the
law is no defence! This maxim may be one of the "sacred cows of
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the criminal law"146 but there is no need to apply it mechanically.
In applying the maxim the court has forgotten that it is dealing with
a vague prohibition and an accused that has taken good faith
precautions to insure compliance with the law. Is this accused to be
sacrificed to maintain the rigidity of the maxim or is the maxim
sufficiently flexible to admit of exceptions that cover the arguably
non-culpable conduct of this accused?
In an age of increasing statutory regulation the presumption
that everyone knows the law appears absurd. The law has become
increasingly inaccessible 147 and it could be said that if laypersons
know anything about the criminal law it is that ignorance of the law
does not excuse.1 4  Critique after critique has been written
condemning the maxim and in one recent article it was aptly stated
that "the overwhelming consensus is that the harshness of the maxim
that ignorance of the law is no excuse should be ameliorated in
favour of the humane principle that those who are without fault
should not be subject to the sanctions of the criminal law."149 We
have entered an era in which there is a widening gulf between
statutory prohibitions and common notions of morality and as the
gulf widens the expectation that everyone could and should know
the law seems to be nothing more than a wistful fantasy. Fletcher
accurately describes the transformation of the maxim into a relic of
a past era:
The tight moral consensus that once supported the criminal law has
obviously disappeared. This has happened as a result both of the vast expansion
of the criminal law into regulatory offenses and the disintegration of the Judeo-
Christian moral consensus. In a pluralistic society, saddled with criminal sanctions
affecting every area of life, one cannot expect that everyone know what is criminal
and what is not. The problem is compounded in some fields, such as abortion and
146A.T.H. Smith, "Judicial Law Making in the Criminal Law" (1984) 100 L.Q.R. 46 at 70.
1 4 7 For two studies illustrating the inaccessibility of contemporary law see, M.L. Friedland,
Access to the Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1975); Justice (Society), Breaking the Rules (London:
Justice, 1980). See also, M.P. Furmston, "Ignorance of the Law" (1981) 1 Legal Studies 37 in
which the author illustrates that the law is not only inaccessible to laypersons but that it
presents problems even for practitioners.
148R Singer, "On Classism and Dissonance in the Criminal Law- A Reply to Professor
Meir Dan-Cohen" (1986) 77 J. of Criminal Law and Criminology 69 at 78.
1 4 9A.T.H. Smith, "Error and Mistake of Law in Anglo-American Criminal Law Review"
(1985) 14 Anglo-American L.R. 3.
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obscenity, by constantly changing standards of permissible conduct. The "obscenity*
that could send Ralph Ginzburg to jail for five years is now readily exhibited at
adult theaters around the United States. Assuming that everyone who violates the
law does so in disregard and disrespect of the law is obviously outdated. M i' aining
that policy today verges on blindness to the problem of individual justice.%
The maxim that ignorance of the law is no defence is framed
as a categorical imperative that admits of no exceptions, but in fact
both the legislature and the judiciary have been carving exceptions
that are slowly eroding the primacy of this maxim. The Ontario
Court of Appeal could have easily allowed Metro News to plea lack
of knowledge with respect to community standards without doing
violence to the development of the law in this area.
In Canada, England, and the United States the courts have
moved to reform the maxim with circumspection, yet some reform
has been achieved. In all three jurisdictions the courts have
recognized that no person should be convicted on the basis of
unavailable or unpublished law.151 This exception has now been
formally recognized in legislative enactments in all three
jurisdictions.1 52 In a recent development, the Nova Scotia County
Court has suggested that the maxim would not operate in
circumstances of a duly promulgated, but obscure, piece of
subordinate legislation that was generally inaccessible to the
public.153 The inaccessibility of some law, and the corresponding
unfairness in convicting on the basis of this type of law, has been
characterized by one judge as follows: "I'm saying to swim through
these regulations is like being dumped into a bath of heavy oil, and
I think you would drown before you could ever get across. n
154
150Fletcher, supra, note 90 at 731-32.
151Lanibert v. California, 355 U.S. Reports 225 (1957); R v. Lim Chin Aik (1963), A.C. 160
(P.C.); R. v. Ross (1944), 84 C.C.C. 107 (B.C. Co. Ct.); Re Michelin Tires (1975), 15 N.S.R (2d)
150 ( N.S.C.A.).
1 5 2 1n England in the Statutory InstrunientsAct 1946 and Canada in the Statutory Instruments
Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 38. In the United States several states have adopted the provisions of
the Model Penal Code, s. 2.04 (3)(a) dealing with a defence of mistake of law based upon laws
that have not been published or promulgated.
153k v. Maclean (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
1 5 4 R v. Tangen, unreported decision of the Ont. District Ct. (May 16, 1986) - as quoted
in Appellant's factum filed on appeal to Ont. CA #518/86.
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
In addition the courts have retreated from their earlier
position of rejecting a defence of mistake of law when it is based
upon erroneous advice given by a government official. In a gradual
incremental fashion the courts have begun to outline the scope of
a defence of officially-induced error. The discussion of the
emergence of this defence can be found later in this paper, but it
is sufficient to note that in cases acknowledging this defence it is
common for the court to comment on the disutility of the maxim:
"it is our opinion that a blind application of such a rule would
violate the principle of fundamental fairness implicit in our
jurisprudence."1
55
Professor Meir Dan-Cohen has recently noted that the
maxim "far from being an exhaustive statement of the law, is in
reality a mere starting point for a complex set of conflicting
standards and considerations that allow courts to avoid many of the
harsh results that strict adherence to the maxim would entail."'1 6 The
judiciary has undertaken the task of dismantling the rigours of the
maxim, and in place of a rigid denial of the defence the courts have
substituted "an endless array of decisional variables that give rise to
almost endless permutations."157 In the view of Professor Dan-Cohen
a defence of mistake of law would be recognized by the courts if
the following factors are present: 1) the offence is mala prohibitum;
2) the charge is based upon a regulation; 3) the subject matter is
not likely to be legally regulated; 4) the statute in question does not
serve an important purpose; 5) mens rea is negated by the ignorance
of the law; 6) the offence charged is a specific-intent crime; 7) the
ignorance pertains to a non-criminal law; 8) the defendant relied on
an authoritative source of law; 9) the charge is based upon an
omission.15
8
Once it is recognized by the courts that numerous exceptions
must be placed upon the operation of the maxim an obvious
155State v. Davis, 216 N.W. (2d) 31, 34 (1974) (Sup. Ct. Wisc.).
156M. Dan-Cohen, "Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law" (1984) 97 Harv. L.R 625 at 646.
15 71bid. at 647.
1 5 81bid. at 646.
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question emerges - why not simply abrogate the maxim in its
entirety? In his critique of the maxim Cass contends that:
The crux of the case against ignorantia legis thus is embodied in this question: if it
is inconsistent with basic notions of fairness to penalize one for an act that, because
of the nonexistence, inaccessibility or vagueness of the law, the actor believed legal
when dyg, why is it fair to punish one who is ignorant of the law for any other
reason.
It is utterly anomalous to presume that Metro News knew
that the Sakura edition of Penthouse exceeded community standards.
The denial of a defence of mistake of law in these circumstances
results in the penalization of a citizen without a requisite finding of
criminal culpability. When Blackstone and Hale made their oracular
pronouncement that everyone is presumed to know the law their
resort to this fiction may have served an apologetic function 160 (i.e.
to obscure an unpleasant truth) or it may have served the function
of reconciling a legal result with some expressed or assumed
premise. In other words, as expressed by Lon Fuller, "the conclusive
presumption that everyone knows the law is apparently, intended to
escape an assumed moral principle that it is unjust to visit the legal
consequences of an act upon a person who does not know the
law."161 The fiction served to mask the reality that the maxim was a
departure from the accepted principle that culpability is an essential
element of criminality; however, over the course of the past two
hundred years the mask has been lifted and the injustice of
convicting defendants like Metro News has been recognized, yet
jurists continue to search for some rationale to preserve the maxim.
Some commentators and jurists have refrained the paradigm
of imputed knowledge to transform the presumption of knowledge
into an affirmative duty. for citizens to discover their legal
obligations.1 62 The citizen cannot be presumed to know the law, but
159RA. Cass, "Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined" (1976) 17 William and Mary
L.R. 671 at 689.
1 6 0 L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1967) at 83-84.
1 6 11bid. at 53.
1 6 2 G.L. Williams, CriminalLaw: The GeneralPart (London: Stevens, 1961) at 293; Smith,
supra, note 149 at 24.
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as Professor Williams suggests the citizen can be presumed "to
maintain throughout life an active interest in his legal obligations"
and be "willing to search the law out...."1 63 In transforming the
paradigm in this manner one has fundamentally transformed the
maxim in that all reasonable mistakes of law (i.e. that follow from
due diligence in ascertaining the law) should operate as a valid
defence. In fact, many jurisdictions ranging from China to many
Latin-American countries, have incorporated the reasonable mistake
of law into their arsenal of criminal defences.164 For example,
section 17 of the German Criminal Code reads:
If in the commission of the (criminal) act, the actor fails to perceive that he is doing
wrong and if he could not have avoided the mistake, the actor lacks culpability. If
he could have avoided the mistake, his punishment may be mitigated in accordance
with paraA9(1).
In light of this development on an international level the
pertinacious tendency of common law jurisdictions to retain the
maxim appears to be a "derelict on the waters of law."
165
One cannot fault the Ontario Court of Appeal for failing to
give effect to the wise and welcome developments in other
jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the prescriptive analysis that has been
outlined above, the Ontario Court of Appeal was still confronted
with the elliptical and absolute prohibition found in s.19 of the
Ciminal Code which simply reads: Ignorance of the law by a person
who commits an offence is not an excuse for committing that
offence. It would indeed be a court of great temerity that would
create a defence of reasonable mistake of law in the face of this
unequivocal legislative provision. However, courts have disregarded
the plain meaning of this type of prohibition and have managed to
limit its operation by creating numerous exceptions. In addition to
the factors listed by Professor Dan-Cohen there is another
mechanism that the Ontario Court of Appeal could have employed
to give effect to the plea of Metro News.
1 63Williams, supra, note 137 at 292.
1 64P.K. Ryu & H. Silving, -Comment on Error Juris" (1976) 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 689-93.
1 65Lambert, supra, note 151 at 232 - this was the expression used by the dissenters to
characterize what they believed was the holding of the majority to the effect that sanctions
cannot be applied without giving the defendant fair notice of the prohibition.
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In attempting to limit the operation of the maxim the courts
in Canada, England, and the United States have employed a
technique of statutory construction that Professor Fletcher has
characterized as the "formal approach to the problem."16 Under this
approach the courts will examine the statutory language of the
offence to determine if there is some phrase or grammatical
construction that will support an inference that a mistake of law can
negate the specific intent required by the offence. Without eroding
the primacy of the maxim the court, in these special circumstances,
will be able to rationalize the exculpatory effect of the maxim. In
these cases the court need not even discuss the maxim but can
simply assert that the mistake, although one of law, has negated a
specific requirement of the offence.
167
The formalistic approach looks for certain catchwords (i.e.
fraudulently, corruptly, maliciously, willfully, etc...) and examines their
grammatical placement to determine the effect of mistake of law.
The most common example of this approach is found in the case of
property offences that include the words "claim of right" in the
statutory formulation of the offence. In Canada and England a
bona flde, but erroneous, belief in ownership rights will operate as
a defence to theft, robbery, and malicious damage.'5 8 Some
commentators and jurists have characterized this formal approach by
the proposition that ignorance of a mistake as to civil or non-penal
law is an exception to the maxim.
1 69
The formalistic approach is not to be warmly embraced - it
is a technique of last resort. It suffers from a sense of artificiality
because of its reliance upon the "fortuities of legislative drafting as
166Fletcher, supra, note 90 at 736.
1 6 7An example of this technique can be found in People v. Weiss, 12 N.E. (2d) 514 (1938)
(N.Y.C. App.) in which the court concluded that the grammatical placement of the word
"intent" before the phrase "without authority of law" led to an inference that a defendant's
intention must also be directed to his lawful authority, and accordingly a mistake as to legal
authority negated the mens rea for the offence.
168See R. v. Reed (1842), Car. & Mar. 306; R. v. Hall (1828), 3 C. & P. 409; R. v. Smith
(1974), Q.B. 354; R. v. Howson, [1966] 3 C.C.C. 348 (Ont. CA.); R. v. Carrol (1975), 27 C.C.C.
(2d) 276 (Ont. CA.).
1 6 9 R1M. Perkins, "Ignorance or Mistake of Law Revisited" (1980) 3 Utah L Rev. 473 at
475.6; P. Matthews, "Ignorance of the aw is No Excuse?" (1983) 3 Legal Studies 174 at 175.
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a way of resolving a particular case without confronting the broader
theoretical issue."170 Nevertheless, the Ontario Court of Appeal
could have approached the Metro News case in the following
manner:
1) The accused company was not pleading that it was
unaware of the existence of the law prohibiting the distribution of
obscenity. It was merely asserting that it did not believe that the
material in question was obscene because it did not know that the
material exceeded community standards.
2) The company's belief was premised upon reasonable
reliance on official and non-official sources of information;
accordingly, the company not only knew of the law but it
endeavoured to comply. In short, one could conclude that the
company was not acting culpably.
3) Parliament violated the Charter by including a provision
that stated that it would not be a defence if the accused was
"ignorant of the nature or presence of the matter."
This provision was struck down but the fact that Parliament felt it
necessary to enact this exclusionary provision implicitly suggests that
Parliament believed that knowledge of the nature and presence of
the material is a requisite element of the offence. Knowledge of
the nature of the material is synonymous with knowledge that the
material is obscene.
Approaching the case in this manner is not inconsistent with
the approach to other offences. The offence of fraud has been
defined as requiring dishonest deprivation.171 Dishonesty is an
elusive concept but many courts have been content to define
dishonesty in an open-ended manner that is similar to the definition
of obscenity. That is to say, some courts define dishonest as
conduct that would be considered dishonest in the eyes of "ordinary
decent people."172  The offence of fraud requires resort to a
community standard of dishonesty. The necessity of evaluating the
170Fletcher, supra, note 90 at 739.
171R v. Olan, Hudson and Hartnett (1978), 41 C.C.C. (2d) 145 (S.C.C.).
1 72 R v. Feely (1972), 57 Cr. App. R. (CA.); see discussion in D. Doherty, ''he Mcns Rca
of Fraud" (1982-83) 25 C.L.Q. 348.
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accused's conduct by reference to a community standard has not
resulted in an absolute rejection by the courts of a plea by the
accused that he did not know that his conduct exceeded community
standards. Although the point is far from settled in Canada,173 it is
clear that the courts in England have not encountered any difficulty
in formulating the mens rea of fraud to require knowledge that the
alleged fraudulent conduct would be considered dishonest in the
eyes of the community
74
If an offence cannot be formulated with precision and it can
only be defined with resort to the nebulous notion of community
standards then the court must accept that community standards
become an essential element of the offence to which mens rea must
be directed. If fraud was defined as lying about the quality of goods
or obscenity was defined as depicting an erect penis then surely the
court would require that the accused know of the lie or of the erect
penis. The court would not question whether this knowledge was as
to fact or law but would simply state that mens rea can only be
satisfied upon proof of knowledge of all essential elements of the
offence. Why should it make a difference if the essential element
is not an ascertainable element like an erect penis but is instead a
more amorphous element like the community standard? An essential
element of an offence does not vary depending upon the specificity
of its formulation.
Recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the
conviction of Nazi propagandist, Ernst Zundel, on a charge of
"willfully publishing a statement, tale or news that he knows is
false."175 One of the grounds for reversal was that the trial judge
directed the jury that they could only convict if the accused
published the material with no honest belief in the truth of the
assertions in the material. This was considered an erroneous
173The issue was left unresolved in R v. Black and Whiteside (1983), 5 C.C.C. (3d) 313
(Ont. C.A.).
1741n R v. Ghosh, [1982] 3 W.Lt. 110 at 118-19 the court indicates that after determining
whether objectively the conduct is considered dishonest by community standards then "the jury
must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was
by those standards dishonest".
175Pv. Zundel, (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. CA.).
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direction because the court held that the offence "requires proof of
actual knowledge of the falsity of the statements. Recklessness as
to the truth of the statements is insufficient."1 6 Falsity of statement
is an essential element of the offence - without the element of
falsity the definition of the offence would not convey a "morally
significant prohibition."177 Similarly, the offence of distributing
obscenity can only be considered a coherent and significant
prohibitory norm if its definition includes as an essential element
that the material is obscene by virtue of it exceeding the community
standard of tolerance. Falsity or obscenity is the heart of either
offence and there cannot be a violation of either norm if the actor
is not aware that he is dealing with material that activates the
prohibitory norm. If knowledge of falsity or obscenity is required
then, as recognized in the Zundel case, "wilful blindness is, of
course, the equivalent of actual knowledge."178 Accordingly, an
individual cannot hide behind a veil of blissful ignorance, and if he
has reason to suspect that he has entered the domain of falsity or
obscenity then he is obligated to insure that the material does not
in fact violate the prohibitory norm.
The Court of Appeal resisted this line of reasoning and
relied upon the assertion of Glanville Williams that "where a rule of
law involves the making of a value-judgment, the doctrine of mens
rea does not generally apply in respect of the value judgment."179 If
this be so then it should equally apply to the offence of fraud which
has a component of value-judgment in the definition of dishonesty.
William's assertion must be of questionable validity because the only
examples he relies upon to prove the assertion are offences of
negligence and justificatory defences. The notion of putative
justification shares little in common with the process of delineating
the essential elements of an offence and it is dangerous to infer that
mens rea does not apply to elements of an offence that engage
1 76 1bid. at 157.
177Fletcher, supra, note 90 at 695.
178Zundel, supra, note 175 at 157.
179 Williams, supra, note 137 at 141.
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value judgments from the fact that we do not allow an individual to
plea that s/he mistakenly thought s/he was applying proportionate
force on self-defence. The fact that offences of negligence do not
admit of a plea that the actor mistakenly thought that he or she was
acting in accord with the standard of the reasonable person also
does not support William's assertion. For crimes of negligence,
which is a category of offence that has many detractors, we are
dealing with the culpability of inadvertence °80 and as such it is
incongruous to argue from this that knowledge is not an essential
element of crimes that deal in the culpability of material awareness.
For true crimes inadvertence is not a sufficient barometer of guilt,
and if the legislature chooses to include a value-judgment as an
essential element of the offence then the actor's material awareness
must extend to this element.
As previously mentioned, the Ontario Court of Appeal may
be excused for not attempting to limit the operation of the maxim
in the ways outlined above. It may be too much to ask of a court
to disregard the conservative forces within the judiciary that cling to
the maxim with the same tenacity as Blackstone. As recently as
1982 the House of Lords could still credibly propose that:
The principle that ignorance of the law is no defence in crime is so fundamental
that to construe the word "knowingly" in a criminal statute as not requiring merely
knowledge of the facts material to the offender's guilt, but also knowledge of the
relevant law, would be revolutionary and, to my mind, wholly unacceptable.
In addition the Ontario Court of Appeal could find comfort in the
recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Molis in
which the court concluded that the defence of due diligence meant
"due diligence in relation to the fulfillment of a duty imposed by
law and not in relation to the ascertainment of the existence of a
prohibition or its interpretation."18 2 Whether right or wrong this
statement is enough to close the door on the exculpatory plea of
the accused company. Before turning to some concluding
180On the culpability of inadvertence see, G. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence:
A Comparative Analysis" (1971) 119 U. Penn. L Rev. 401; Hart, supra, note 108 at 151.
1 8 1 Grant v. Borg (1982), 1 W.L.R. 638.
182, v. Molis (1980), 55 C.C.C. (2d) 558 at 564 (S.C.C.).
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observations speculating on the reasons why the court took the easy
way out by allowing an anachronistic maxim to override an
individualized assessment of culpability, there is one last and brief
matter left to discuss. Even after the characterization of the offence
as strict liability, and the rejection of a plea of mistake of law, there
remained one last avenue open to the company.
V. OFFICIALLY-INDUCED ERROR
Slowly emerging from the ruins of the maxim is a defence
known as officially-induced error. It has found legislative
recognition in numerous American jurisdictions,183 it has been
endorsed by the Law Reform Commission of Canada,184 and it has
been recognized or approved of by a number of courts in Canada.
185
Most significantly, the Ontario Court of Appeal, a few months prior
to the decision in Metro News, clearly established officially-induced
error as a recognized defence. In R v. Cancoil Thennal18 6 the
Ontario Court of Appeal decided that the defence will operate
where an accused has reasonably relied upon the erroneous legal
opinion or advice of an official who is responsible for the
administration of the particular law.
Not only must an accused rely upon the opinion or advice of
an official but the accused's reliance upon the misstatement must be
183For a listing of states which have incorporated this defence see, P. Robinson, Criminal
Law Defences (St. Paul, Minn.: West Pub., 1984) at 389-94; for the historical development of
the defence in the United States see, P.S. Cremer, "The Ironies of Law Reform: A History of
Reliance on Officials as a Defence in American Criminal Law" (1978) 14 Calif. W.L.RI 48.
184Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Paper 29, "Criminal Law, The General
Part: Liability & Defences" (Ottawa: The Commission, 1982) at 77-84 - recently endorsed in
their Report 30, "Recodifying Criminal Law" (Ottawa: The Commission, 1986) at 31-32.
1 85 See discussion of cases in N. Kastner, "Mistake of Law and Officially Induced Error"
(1985-86) 28 C.LQ. 308; see, also Cancoil case, infra, note 186.
1 8 6R v. Cancoil Thermal Corp. andParkinson (1986) 52 C.R (3d) 188 (Ont. CA.); it must
be noted that the Court stated that the defence will only apply for regulatory offences and as
such it may not operate for the offence of obscenity, however, it must also be remembered that
in Metro News the court classified obscenity as strict liability, therefore by two erroneous rulings
(that is, that obscenity is regulatory and that the defence only applies to regulatory) there
should not have been any bar to the court considering the defence in this case.
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reasonable. Determining whether or not one's reliance upon official
advice was reasonable would require an examination of factors such
as: 1) the efforts made to ascertain the proper law; 2) the
complexity or obscurity of the law; 3) the position of the official
who gave the advice; 4) the clarity, definitiveness, and
reasonableness of the advice given.187 It would appear that Metro
News satisfied the requirements of reasonable reliance - recall that:
1) the publication was approved by Canada Customs; 2) the
impugned photographs had appeared in another journal six months
earlier without any objection; 3) the publication had been approved
by a trade association committee established with the approval of
the Attorney General; 4) the police indicated that they would not
charge unless they first warned the company to permit the company
to withdraw the publication from circulation; 5) the Crown could
have proceeded by way of an in rem proceeding under s. 160 instead
of prosecution.
With the exception of the last-mentioned factor (which
amounts to nothing more than wishful thinking), the advice received
and the steps undertaken by the company were not only reasonable,
but may have been all that the company could have done. The
difficulty with the application of the defence stems from the
limitation in the Cancoil case that the opinion or advice relied upon
must have been received from an "official who is responsible for the
administration of the law.t1ss Even prior to the establishment of this
defence the weight of authority clearly suggested that advice
received from Customs or provincial censor boards could not
immunize a defendant from prosecution by the Attorney-General;
18 9
however, why is it necessary to restrict this emerging defence to
official misstatements? This limitation indicates that the defence is
based upon an estoppel rationale and not a culpability rationale.
The estoppel rationale reflects the view that it is improper and
unfair to allow a government that has caused a mistake by providing
1871bid. at 199.
188Ibid.
1 8 9 For example, R v. McFall (1975), 26 C.C.C. (2d) 181 (B.C.CA.); R. v. Prairie Schooner
News Ltd. and Powers (1970), 1 C.C.C. (2d) 251 (Man. CA.); Daylight case, supra, note 37 and
294555 case, supra, note 37.
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erroneous advice to then prosecute for conduct performed in
accordance with that advice. Under this rationale there is no
necessary connection between reliance upon the advice and the issue
of the defendant's culpability or accountability. By focussing upon
estoppel and avoiding discussion of culpability a court or legislature
can also avoid dealing with the implications of culpability; that is,
the abandonment of the maxim and its replacement with a defence
of reasonable mistake of law.
The accused company could have tried to persuade the court
to move towards a culpability rationale. In Cancoil, the court
required reasonable reliance and it could be argued that this
limitation sufficiently constrains the defence, and so long as the
reliance is reasonable it need not matter whether the advice came
from the appropriate official, the police, or the accused's lawyer.
We need not worry about devious individuals trying to insulate
themselves by relying upon advice given by those incompetent to do
so because surely it would not be reasonable reliance to seek refuge
in legal advice given by my plumber or mother.
The estoppel rationale is far too narrow and it is unclear as
to which officials are empowered to mislead for the purposes of the
defence. In this case, would the relevant official be the provincial
Attorney-General, his agents (a Crown Attorney), the Federal
Department of Justice, the police, or members of the judiciary? The
most likely choice would be the provincial Attorney-General but in
1976 this official refused to establish a screening committee for
questionable publications. The Crown Attorneys and the judges are
unlikely to give advice because they do not see themselves in the
business of giving advance rulings. The Federal Department of
Justice is accustomed to giving advice but it is unlikely that this law
and policy-making department would be considered an official
responsible for the administration of the law.
When most people have legal difficulties they will consult
with a lawyer, a low-level bureaucrat (especially if the problem
concerns the filing of forms), or the police.19 Lawyers and low-
level bureaucrats are not officials involved in administering the law
but arguably the police are, and in that capacity they can give advice
190See Friedland, supra, note 147.
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that should shield citizens from later prosecution. In this case the
police informed the accused company that they would not prosecute
until they first gave warning. No such warning was given and it was
reasonable for the company to assume that the police had found
nothing objectionable in the publication because no complaint or
objection was launched six months earlier when the photographs
first appeared in another magazine and the company had been told
by a committee with valuable experience in this area that the
material did not exceed community standards.
Even within the constraints of an estoppel rationale it would
have been plausible to argue that the advice given by the police
satisfied the requirements of official misstatement. Nevertheless, it
is submitted that the estoppel is fundamentally flawed and should be
replaced with a culpability rationale. Culpability presupposes a
choice to violate legal imperatives and there is obviously no choice
if one is actually misled into believing that there exists no such
imperative. Assuming the reliance to be reasonable why should it
be incumbent upon the citizen to check and evaluate the authority
of the government official from whom advice is received? If the
official has no authority, then he or she should refrain from giving
advice or at least direct the citizen to the proper officials. Reliance
upon a government official who is not authorized to give advice in
a certain area of law has been recognized as sufficient to sustain a
claim of estoppel. In Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, Lord
Denning allowed an individual to rely upon an assurance given by an
official in the wrong ministry. He stated:
The War Office did not refer him to the Minister of Pensions. They assumed
authority over the matter and assured the appellant that his disability had been
accepted as attributable to military service. He was entitled to assume that they had
consulted any other departments that might be concerned...before they gave him the
assurance... In my opinion if a government department in its dealings with a subject
takes it upon itself to assume authority upon a matter with which he is concerned,
he is entitled to rely upon it having the authority which it assumes. He does not
know, and cannot be expected to know, the limits of its authority. The department
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itself is clearly bound, and as it is but an agent for the Crown, it binds the Crown
also; and as the CroT is bound, so are other departments, for they also are but
agents of the Crown.
All of these arguments concerning the proper scope and
interpretation of the defence of officially-induced error were not
addressed in the appellate court. The problem of reliance was dealt
with as an issue of abuse of process, and accordingly it was easy for
the court to avoid examining the issues of culpability, the
reasonability of reliance, and the appropriate official who could
trigger a claim of estoppel. Once characterized as a question of
abuse of process the court's focus would not be on the
circumstances of the offender but instead the court would evaluate
the conduct of the prosecution to determine if the proceedings were
"vexatious or oppressive. 192 Abuse of process is reserved for the
"clearest of cases"193 and it is rarely successful as a plea in the
absence of proof of mala fides or oblique motive on behalf of the
Crown.1
94
When the issue is framed as an abuse of process the
company's plea becomes tenuous. All the factors relied upon by the
company have little or nothing to do with prosecutorial conduct.
Accordingly, it is easy for the court to dismiss the claim by simply
stating that "in my view none of the above circumstances, considered
singly or cumulatively, constitutes the prosecution of the appellant
an abuse of process. ''19s The artificiality of this conclusion becomes
evident if we change the facts slightly by examining the implications
of introducing a Crown Attorney into the picture. If a Crown
Attorney, instead of the police, indicated that they would not
1 91 Robertson v. Minister of Pensions [1949] 1 KB. 227 at 232; this proposition was criticized
by the House of Lords in Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Ltd., [1951] A.C. 837; the
Canadian position on estoppel against the government is not clear but see, Re Violi (1965), 51
D.L.R. (2d) 506 (S.C.C.); Re Citizenship and Holvenstot, [1982] F.C. 279 (F.C.T.D.).
192P, v. Young (1984), 40 C.RI (3d) 289 at 329 (Ont. CA.); R. v. Jewitt, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 128.
1 93Sbid.
1 9 4See 1 v. Keyowski (1986), 53 C.R. (3d) 1 (Sask. CA.); and see the distinction drawn by
Lamer J. in Mills v. R. (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at 548-9 (S.C.C.) between abusive process and
abuse of process with the latter being reserved for improper motive on behalf of the Crown.
195Metro News, supra, note 2 at 330.
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proceed with a prosecution unless they had warned the company and
given the company the opportunity to remove the publication from
circulation then clearly this would constitute an abuse of process.
19 6
In Re Smith and the Queen197 an arrangement had been made with
the accused to the effect that if he would turn over marijuana no
charges would be laid with respect to any marijuana turned in. This
is analogous to an arrangement of no charges if a publication is
removed from circulation. After turning in the narcotics charges
were laid, but the court granted a writ of prohibition on the basis
that:
The ordinary man, having made such a deal with Crown counsel, would feel that he
could walk in safety thereafter. He would be astounded and amazed if charges of
conspiracy could be proceeded with. I think what occurred in this case constitutes
oppre Tn. The ordinary man is entitled to expect that the Crown will keep its
word.
" J
If a Crown Attorney is not permitted to repudiate
arrangements arrived at in good faith then the same considerations
should apply to representations made by police officers. By framing
the issue as one of abuse of process the court could avoid any
examination of the conduct of the police force. The issue should
have been explored in the context of the emerging defence of
officially-induced error, and the accused should have been acquitted
on the basis of reasonable reliance upon representations that made
the illegal acts of the company non-culpable and not deserving of
punishment.
196For cases in which the courts have not allowed the Crown to repudiate any promises
or deals made see R. v.Agozzino, [1970] 1 O.R. 480, 1 C.C.C. (2d) 380 (Ont. CA.); R. v. Betesh
(1975), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 233 (Ont. Co. Ct.); Re Citizenship, supra, note 191; also see R. v.
Skogman (1984), 41 C.RL (3d) 1 in which the S.C.C. held that the Crown is bound to the
position it takes upon an appeal.
197(1974), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 268 (B.C.S.C.).
1 9 8 1bid. at 272.
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VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The ongoing political battle to curb the distribution of
obscene material must have an impact on the adjudicatory function
of courts of law. The Metro News case superficially resembles a
conventional normative analysis of criminal law defences,19 but one
must wonder why the court resolved the case in an insipid manner
that stunts the evolutionary growth of the defence of legal mistake.
By comparing the demands of a normative theory of culpability and
the legal conclusions reached by the court a conclusion could be
drawn that the court has abandoned the enterprise of a principled
elaboration of criminal liability for the sake of assisting the state in
its battle against obscenity. The court's treatment of the issue of
obscenity lends support to the critical approach that views the
judiciary as just another state instrumentality. In another context
Professor McGinley reached a similar conclusion:
When one considers these meager defences and the standards under which they
have been admitted, the judiciary rather than constituting a moral brake to the
carriage of the sta,appear rather as its postilions stringently maintaining the
velocity of its telos.
The view of the court as a mere state instrumentality may
appear far too deterministic or reductionistic. It is an ideological
view that finds support in the analysis of the Metro News case, with
its recurrent references to state enforcement needs, but it is a view
that needs greater support than this analysis of judicial performance
in the field of obscenity law. Stripped of its ideological component,
the state instrumentality function can be restated in more neutral,
and hence less controversial, terms. This more neutral view
understands the court to be a weathervane that changes position in
light of political developments and pressures. "Any which way the
wind blows" becomes the informing principle of judicial
1991t has been said that the "function of law is to give each of us the impression that the
system operates according to a normative law" - N. Gabel, "Reification in Legal Reasoning"
(1980) 3 Research in Law and Sociology 25 at 29.
200McGinley, supra, note 3 at 299.
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decisionmaking. 201  One need not advance some underlying
conspiratorial agreement between the branches of government to
prove that the courts "wag their tails for the ruling classes"202; the
perspective of the court as weathervane is simply a reflection of the
obvious fact that judges, like everyone else, read newspapers and
watch television and are thereby influenced (or corrupted) by what
they see happening around them.
Unfortunately, the weathervane metaphor is really only a
concession that judges are human and as such it is too trite to have
any real explanatory power. However, one does begin to see that
the judicial weathervane is not an ordinary weathervane but is one
with a mission. This observation becomes clearer upon noticing that
obscenity law is not the only area in which the court has taken a
restrictive stance with respect to the issues of strict liability and
mistake of law. The courts have also had difficulty allowing the
growth of culpability-based defences of legal mistake in the area of
firearm, gambling, and narcotic offences.2 °3 What these offences all
share in common is their characterization as mala prohibitum, and
it may be that their lack of grounding in conventional morality has
made the court hesitant to allow a defence of mistake of law when
in fact the critical element in the continued existence of a mala
prohibita offence is its assimilation into the legal awareness of
citizens.
In an insightful article on mistake of law Professor Zupancic
outlines the difficulty with admitting mistake of law for "extrinsic
norms."2°4 The core offences have an "organic extra-legal reference
point" in that they create a tangible harm that, even in the absence
of legal action, will produce "remedial lacunae." The core offences
are norms that are dictated by life itself and as such are intrinsic
201It is interesting to note that in the Netherlands, where the political and social climate
is more relaxed with respect to pornography, the courts have taken a permissive, liberal
approach to the interpretation of their obscenity laws - see, Committee, supra, note 14 at 251.
202M. Mandel, "Marxism and the Rule of Law" (1986) 35 U.N.B.L.J. 7 at 19.
2 0 3 See Molis, supra, note 182 (re: narcotics); R v. Potter (1978), 3 C.RI (3d) 154
(P.E.I.S.C.) (re: gambling); R. v. Baxter (1982), 6 C.C.C. (3d) 447 (Alta. C.A.) (re: firearms).
2 0 4 B. Zupancic, "Criminal Responsibility Under Mistake of Law: The Real Reasons" (1985)
13 Am. J. Crim. L 37, 43-45.
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norms. Most other criminal offences are not dictated by life itself
but are dictated by "somebody's will and power" and the "moral
damage" caused by these crimes "cannot be objectively
evaluated."2°5These extrinsic norms lead a precarious existence and
they are in constant danger of being consumed by the demands of
subjective guilt. As a result of lacking an objectively calculated
assessment of harm these extrinsic norms move to a position of
subjectification as a proxy for culpability: however, there must be
limits to the process of subjectification because the "rising curve of
subjectification threatens to destroy the very existence of the
norm."2°6 If we were to take all subjective considerations relating to
the actor into account in assessing culpability it would be impossible
to blame actors - as Fletcher has said: "it goes without saying that
a person's life experience may shape his character. Yet if we excuse
on the grounds of prolonged social deprivation the theory of excuses
would begin to absorb the criminal law.
' 207
Zupancic proposes that for extrinsic norms it is necessary to
stop the subjectification process short of admitting legal mistakes.
In his view "the existence of arbitrary extrinsic norms is precariously
dependent upon rigid formalistic interpretation and consistent
enforcement"208 and without the concrete enforcement of these
norms they lose their life-force. The resort to the subjectification of
the norm by allowing a mistake of law to excuse positively destroys
the norm by preventing the concretization of its objective meaning.
For extrinsic norms it is a misconception to believe that the norm is
extant because it was promulgated in abstracto. A scientific law may
be disregarded and still continue to impact - an intrinsic norm
embodied in tort law or a core criminal offence may be disregarded
because its lack of enforcement still leaves something behind that
cries out for vindication. However, the disregard of an extrinsic
norm such as the obscenity law leaves nothing behind and inevitably
2051bid. at 37-38.
2061bid. at 41.
2 0 7 G.p. Fletcher, "The Individualization of Excusing Conditions" (1973-74) 47 Southern
Calif. L.R. 1269.
2 0 8 Zupancic, supra, note 204 at 45.
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it annihilates the social morality that gave birth to the norm. It is
conceivable that with increased normative integration (i.e. as the
norm is supported by organic social support) we will not have to
rely upon mechanical enforcement to guarantee the continued
existence of the norm; however, until this point is reached it is
necessary to limit considerations of subjective guilt as an
approximation of culpability to maintain the objective normative
impact of the rule.
This explanation suggests that the court as weathervane has
as its mission the maintenance of the will and power of the state.
Unlike the view of the court as a state instrumentality it is not
necessary to prove a conspiratorial connection between state and
court but rather the impulse to limit considerations of guilt flows
from an unconscious understanding that the norm is too precarious
to admit of all defences. The court's role in maintaining state
authority is to deny any defence that threatens the continued
existence of offences of dubious legitimacy. When the Supreme
Court of Canada in Molis rejected a defence of due diligence in the
ascertainment of a legal duty it was implicitly recognizing that drug
offences could not survive if one could plea that he or she was not
aware of the fact that the legislature had included a particular drug
on a schedule of prohibitions.
As Professor Zupancic realizes, this limiting process
invariably ends up sacrificing some innocent actors for the sake of
maintaining authority. The punishment of subjectively innocent
accused, such as Metro News, is not an easy task for a court to
digest, and it has required the court to construct a rationalization for
this action that is independent of the concern of maintaining the
viability of state-promulgated norms. At the heart of decisions like
Metro News there is an ad hominem justification for erroneous
characterization of offences as strict liability and the rejection of any
form of defence of legal mistake. Basically, the court seems to
believe that the type of citizen who would rely upon a defence of
legal error is not the type of citizen deserving of protection. This
unjustified presupposition is reflected in evocative judicial metaphors
such as: "those who skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a
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sign which will denote the precise spot where he will fall in"209 or "it
is not the function of the court to decide how close to dangerous
waters it is possible to sail without being shipwrecked. 210 This ad
hominem perspective on those who rely upon defences of mistake
of law cannot soften the hardship of convicting the subjectively
innocent. One may agree that a court cannot point to the exact
point at which an individual may fall into icy waters but surely the
court has the obligation to insure that the reckless individual is
forewarned that the ice may be thin at spots. The court-formulated
community standards test does not constitute sufficient warning or
notice that an individual is skating on thin ice, and the court should
not rely upon these evocative metaphors to disguise the fact that
they are penalizing individuals who have done all that is possible to
comply with their legal obligations.
There is great danger in a court becoming engaged in a
political enterprise. Regardless of whether one views the court as
actively engaged in the battle on obscenity or as being involved in
the more modest task of maintaining the viability of extrinsic norms,
the result of undertaking these types of political tasks does not
augur well for an accused individual. The price of war can be
counted by its casualties and Metro News is one of many casualties.
In the attempt to ensure that the obscenity prohibitions are
enforceable and effective the court has and will sacrifice innocent
shopkeepers and distributors who want to conform to the law but
find that in the ordinary course of running their business it is
impossible to avoid the occasional infraction. These casualties of
the war on obscenity are innocent victims because they lack the
requisite culpability which forms the foundation of our justice system
that gives the citizen "a fair opportunity to choose between keeping
the law required for society's protection or paying the penalty."211
Individual autonomy is maximized when the law serves to guide
209D.p.P. v. Knuller [1973], AC. 435 at 463.
20Royal College of Nursing v. D.H.S.S. (1981), 1 All E.R. 545,560 (C.A.); ef., U.S. v. Feola
420 U.S. 671 at 685 (1975).
211Hart, supra, note 108 at 23.
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citizens by increasing the individual's ability to predict when criminal
sanctions will be applied.
It may be a reasonable price to pay for security and order to
sacrifice the autonomy of some people here or there; however, the
individual shopkeeper or distributor is not the only casualty. In
order to sacrifice these individuals it is also necessary to sacrifice the
principled development of doctrine. Metro News could only be
convicted by distorting the law relating to classification of offences
and by stunting the growth of the law relating to legal mistakes,
abuse of process and officially-induced error. Perhaps this case will
be seen as an aberration, a derelict on the water of law, but then
again it is likely that the case will become firmly planted in the body
of precedent that is regularly relied upon in our courts. Decisions
in the area of obscenity, or public morality offences in general, have
a tendency to become precedents for the application of the defence
of mistake of law in other areas of criminal law. The decision of
1? v. Campbell,212 in which a defence of reliance upon an erroneous
judicial decision concerning nude dancing was rejected, has become
standard fare for law students - the decision is included in virtually
every casebook and textbook available in Canada.213 Every student
of law learns to accept the harsh irony that "people in society are
expected to have a more profound knowledge of the law than are
the Judges.
214
In fighting this battle, all that is gained is a pyrrhic victory.
As Kant has said: "no state at war with another state should engage
in hostilities of such a kind as to render mutual confidence
impossible when peace will have been made."215 When the interest
in battling obscenity wanes, as it most likely will when it is no longer
politically fashionable, we will have to live with the hostilities of the
2121? v. Campbell and Mlynarchuk (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 26 (Alta. D.C.).
2131t is included in the three major casebooks presently available - D. Stuart and RI.
Delisle,Learning Canadian Criminal Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1986); DA. Schmeiser, Canadian
Criminal Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985); M.L. Friedland, Cases and Materials on Criminal
Law and Procedure (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1978).
2 1 4 Campbell, supra, note 212 at 32.
215As quoted in N.H. Auden and L Kronenberger, Aphorisms: A Personal Selection
(Toronto: Penguin, 1985) at 304.
1987] 373
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
previous battle - the skewed doctrines and the bitterness of those
wrongly convicted. The courts cannot operate in a vacuum, nor can
they ignore the developments in the political realm, but they should
follow the advice that they have set for themselves in the context of
sentencing: "courts do not impose sentences in response to public
clamour. ' 216 The court should not allow the law to vacillate with the
ebb and flow of public opinion.
The value of adjudicatory law-making is found in its capacity
for supplying continuity, stability, and incremental change. A court
operates best when it tries to apply underlying principles instead of
trying to resolve a case on the basis of contingent policy choices.
Imperfections in the law arise from being out of harmony with
underlying principles - principles which provide the contours for an
open-ended adjudicative process that can only, and should only,
obtain a minimum amount of guidance from legislation. Principles
that are inherently framed in generality, operate to insure that no
person, group, or political association can impose their conception
of the good on others. They are a safeguard against momentary and
arbitrary changes in the social order. In cases like Metro News the
abandonment of principles of culpability in order to satisfy the
interest of policy leads only to confusion and a form of assembly-
line justice that can register many unjust convictions. This is not an
achievement to celebrate on Armistice Day.
216R v. Oliver [1977] 5 W.W.R_ 344 at 346 (B.C.C.A.); Recently, the Supreme Court of
Canada in R v. Collins (1987), 56 C.R1 (3d) 193 had occasion to comment upon the propriety
of taking into account public opinion in judicial decisionmaking (these comments arose in the
context of interpreting the phrase "bringing the administration of justice into disrepute" as
found in s. 24(2) of the Charter). The court approved of the following remarks taken from
academic journals: 1) "the ultimate determination must be with the courts, because they
provide what is often the only effective shelter for individuals and unpopular minorities from
the shifting winds of public passion"; 2) Judges should "concentrate on what they do best:
finding within themselves, with cautionness and impartiality, a basis for their own decisions....he
should not render a decision that would be unacceptable to the community when that community
is not being wrought with passion or otherwise underpassing stress due to current events" (emphasis
added).
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